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Equality is one of the seminal values of modern society. How we treat
people is reflective of the values we cherish, the character of a society
and the norms that comprise it. As members of a social contract, all
people should have an equal claim to rights, opportunities, and services
so that each person can realize and exercise their capacities and dreams,
on par with other members of society. But, of course, the difficult question
is: how is equality achieved? Is this a matter of individual choice,
governmental policy (as determined by the political process), or independent
judicial determination? Much will depend on the nature of the polity.
Does parliamentary democracy, constitutional democracy, or some other
form determine the course of the country?
We will examine the question of equality as determined in two
countries that follow a similar model of constitutional democracy: Germany
and the United States. In both countries, an independent constitutional
court holds the government accountable to the fundamental charter of
the society. Each of the charters contain a core norm of equality as
a fundamental right. Concentrating on the jurisprudence of the two
independent courts-the German Constitutional Court and the United
States Supreme Court-we will examine the content and breadth of
equality jurisprudence in each country to see how each measures up to
satisfaction of this core norm.
Our examination will reveal that the constitutions of both countries
demarcate equality in different ways. The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
enumerates at least nine traits for special attention: "No person shall be
favored or disfavored because of sex, parentage, race, language,
homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person
shall be disfavored because of disability."1 The specificity of the
German Basic Law contrasts with the generality of the United States
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.",2
Accordingly, the German Constitutional Court has a stronger textual
tether to enforce equality norms than the United States Supreme Court,
which mainly relies on judicial interpretation to determine the range of
equality. Nevertheless, both Courts employ judicial reasoning to flesh
out the contours of equality. Both Courts identify certain traits as suspect,
1. GRUNDGESETZ (GG) [Basic Law] May 23, 1949, art. 3(3) (F.R.G.), translated
in PRESS & INFO. OFFICE (F.R.G.), BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
40 (Christian Tomuschat & David P. Curry trans., 1998). Article 3(2) makes clear that
there shall be no gender discrimination: "Men and women shall have equal rights." Id.
art. 3(2); Guy Beaucamp, Das Behindertengrundrecht (Art 3 Abs. 3 Satz 2 GG) im
System der Grundrechtsdogmatik, 15 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 997, 998 (2002)
(pointing out that the purpose of the demarcated traits in article 3(2) and 3(3) is to protect
specified groups from discrimination).
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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meriting intensive judicial scrutiny. Both Courts apply a sliding scale of
review to judge the wide range of classifications made in the law. The
nature of sliding scale review is similar, ranging from very intensive
scrutiny for suspect traits to a more deferential level of review for socio-
economic measures on par with rational basis review. There are
differences, however, in the tenor and quality of review. German
judicial scrutiny tends to be more intensive and rigorous, across the
board, regardless of the trait or classification, thereby containing a
degree of rigor that tends to produce a more logically consistent body of
law.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part I will describe the methodology
and approach of American and German equality law. The constitutional
Courts of both countries value equality highly, resulting in strong and
well developed jurisprudence. Each of the Courts employ a sliding scale
of judicial scrutiny with the degree of scrutiny varying with the trait or
personal interest affected by the governmental measure. Strict or
extremely intensive scrutiny applies to measures targeting personal traits
that especially affect a person's identity, like race, national heritage, or
alienage under United States law, and race, sex, gender, language, national
origin, disability, faith, religion, or political opinion under German law.3
More deferential judicial review is reserved for matters involving socio-
economic measures with an important difference present under German
law. The German Constitutional Court probes even matters of a socio-
economic dimension rigorously if the law under review affects different
groups of people unequally and there is no persuasive justification for
the disparity.
We will then turn to an evaluation of the jurisprudence of the German
Constitutional Court as measured against that of the United States
Supreme Court. Parts Ii and III will evaluate the Courts' treatment of
laws impacting traits of personal dimension; most of these are
immutable, people being unable to affect them much, if at all. Under
United States law, we call these traits suspect classes, like race, national
origin, or alienage.4 German law comprises a much broader set of such
suspect classes: race, sex, gender, language, national origin, disability,
faith, religion or political opinion. Part Ii will focus on several of these
suspect traits apart from gender. Gender equality has received the most
3. GG art. 3, translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE, supra note 1, at 40.
4. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. 216 (1944): United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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attention by the Constitutional Court and, thus, will be handled separately in
Part III. Under German law, gender based measures are subject to strict
scrutiny, as compared to United States law, where gender discrimination
is covered under intermediate scrutiny,5 which also applies to illegitimacy.6
Part IV will evaluate the Courts' treatment of general socio-economic
measures. In German law, inequality resulting in disparate treatment of
different groups of people cannot be justified unless pursuant to a
convincing rationale; the greater the disparity, the greater degree of
judicial scrutiny. This level of review is a form of heightened scrutiny,
somewhat less rigorous than strict scrutiny but more probing than
standard rational basis. Part V will evaluate the Courts' treatment of
general socio-economic measures under a lower level of judicial scrutiny,
normally referred to as rational basis in United States law. Under United
States law, rational basis review essentially means the measure is
presumPtively constitutional unless there is no plausible justification
present. German law is not quite so deferential. Even standard socio-
economic measures are subject to a more probing review if they present
overt inequalities. While the nature of this review is not as intensive, the
Constitutional Court will evaluate the measure carefully and not
presumptively defer to government. Part VI will conclude with comparative
observations about the nature and quality of equality jurisprudence in
the two countries.
1. EQUAL PROTECTION METHODOLOGY
Crucial to equal protection jurisprudence is the methodology developed
by the constitutional Courts, which the courts then employ to circumscribe
government according to the core norm of equality. Let us start with the
touchstone of the Courts' baseline, the text of the fundamental charters.
In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment sets forth the equality
norm, stating it in the typical American constitutional approach of simple
but open-ended text: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."8 As with most constitutional
provisions, it is for the courts to determine with specificity what exactly
equality means.
By contrast, the German constitutional charter or Basic Law is significantly
more concrete and specific as to what equality means, providing much
more textual guidance to the German courts, as is typical of post-World
War Ii constitutions. Article 3 of the Basic Law provides:
5. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
6. E.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
7. E.g.. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co, 449 U.S. 456, 461 63 (1981).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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(1) All persons shall be equal before the law.
(2) Men and women shall have equal rights. The state shall promote the actual
implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to
eliminate disadvantages that now exist.
(3) No person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, parentage, race,
language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No
person shall be disfavored because of disability.
As is apparent from the text of the German charter, there are a fairly
substantial number of personal traits demarcated as special equality
norms, including gender, "sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and
origin, faith, or religious or political opinions." All of these traits are
immutable, except for those involving language, faith, religion, or political
opinion, where a person can exert control over. The wide number of
demarcated personal traits present in the Basic Law contrasts again with
the open ended text of the United States' Fourteenth Amendment. As
with much of American constitutional jurisprudence, it is up the
Supreme Court to identify traits it would regard as suspect. So far,
despite over sixty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence, we can identify
as suspect classes only traits involving race or national originl ° and
9. GG art. 3. translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE. supra note 1, at 40.
10. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
Under the Court's application of the color-blind theory, strict scrutiny applies to any
racial classification, whether affecting minority or majority racial classifications. The
theory first became law in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), where the
Court originally applied strict scrutiny to racial classifications singling out minorities for
preferable treatment only to state governmental actions. The Court then extended the
color blind theory to federal governmental actions as well in Adarand Constr., Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Effectively, this means that affirmative action programs,
designed to redress structural inequality of minority racial groups in American society,
are now also subject to strict scrutiny. For consideration of affirmative action and
especially the color-blind theory, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1087 88. 1109 10 (1991); John Hart Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 735-36
(1974); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 18-19 (1991); Kenneth L. Karst and Harold W. Horowitz, Affirmative Action
and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955. 962 (1974): Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of
Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv.78, 80-81, 96
(1986).
In German law, there has not been much development of race-based affirmative action
programs because the society is approximately 92% ethnically German. EDWARD J.
EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED
STATES 49 (2002) [hereinafter EBERLE. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY]. Turks comprise the
largest ethnic minority, about 1.9 million or roughly 2 percent of the population. Id.; see
also Volkmar G~tz, Minorities, Human Rights and Peace within the State, in STUDIES IN




alienage.11 Matters involving expression 12 and other fundamental rights 13
(besides religion) 14 are also subject to searching judicial review in
United States law. However, this occurs mainly because these rights are
either specifically enumerated in the Constitution or created through
judicial interpretation. By contrast, the Basic Law provides overlapping
textual coverage of these types of norms. Faith, religion, and political
opinion are set out as protected topics in Article 3, but they also merit
independent attention in other provisions of the Basic Law. For example,
religious freedom is demarcated for equal protection in Article 3(3), but
also substantive protection, on its own in Article 4.15 Likewise, expressive
freedoms are similarly handled. They are independently anchored in
Article 5, but also singled out for preference in Article 3(3).16 There
are also other parts of the Basic Law that subsume an equality norm
within their zone of protection. For example, Article 33(1) protects
are permanent immigrants, not German citizens. Id. German ethnic minorities are quite
small. There are about 50,000 Danes. living mainly on the northern border near Denmark: the
Slavic people of the Sorbs (also known as Wends) are approximately 50,000 to 80,000,
and live mainly in the eastern border states of Saxony and Brandenburg; and there also
are about 30,000 Sinti and Roma. Id. at 73.
11. See Sugarman v. Dougall. 413 U.S. 634, 642 43 (1973) (suspect class
treatment for alienage status apply only to state governmental actions, and not federal
governmental, and only when state governmental measures cannot be justified under
public function doctrine.).
12. See, e.g.. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 269 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (marital right to
privacy over use of contraceptives treated as fundamental right).
14. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-90 (1990). Free
Exercise rights subject to a rational basis test of whether the law at issue applies
neutrally, to religion or nonreligion; if it does, law is presumptively constitutional; if
nonneutral in application, Court will apply a more searching level of scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City offHialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
15. Article 4 of the GG provides:
(1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or
philosophical creed [ Weltanschauung], shall be inviolable.
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.
(3) No person shall be compelled against his conscience to render military
service involving the use of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal
law.
GG art. 4, translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE, supra note 1, at 40.
16. Article 5 of the Basic Law provides as follows:
(1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his
opinions in speech. writing, and pictures and to inform himself without
hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and
freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be
guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.
(2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in
provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal
honor.
(3) Art and scholarship, research, and teaching shall be free. The freedom of
teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution.
Id. art. 5, translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE, supra note 1, at 40.
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the equal rights and duties of citizenship;' Article 33(2) guarantees
equal access to political office; 18 and Article 38(1) protects equality in
voting.' 9 The integration of rights protections reflects the integrated
and systematic approach of German law based on the German legal
science of Begriffsjurisprudenz (an intellectually coherent set of ideas
that comprises a legal system).2 °
By way of summary, then, we can observe at least three major
differences between American and German law. One, German law
contains substantially more personal traits demarcated as suspect classes
than American law. Two, German law also requires a heightened quality of
judicial review when a measure touches upon more than one right, such
as, for example, equality and family rights. 2 1 Three, German law also
applies heightened review to socio-economic measures that impose a
great disparity among classes of people. There are other differences as well,
which we will examine shortly. A most notable similarity is that both
Courts apply a sliding scale of judicial review to examine the wide range
of measures gauged under equality. It is possible that the German Court's
employment of sliding scale review is due to transplantation from
22American law, an interesting influence of comparative law. Let us
now focus on the nature of the two laws.
17. "Every German shall have in every Land the same political rights and duties."
Id. art. 33(1), translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE, supra note 1, at 55.
18. "Every German shall be equally eligible for any public office according to his
aptitude, qualifications, and professional achievements." Id. art 33(2), translated in
PRESS & INFO OFFICE. supra note 1. at 55.
19. "Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free,
equal, and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound
by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience." Id. art. 38(1)
translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE, supra note 1, at 57.
20. For explanation of this idea, see Edward J. Eberle, The German Idea of
Freedom, OR. REV. INT'L L. n.28 (forthcoming).
21. See, e.g., Illegitimate Child Orphan, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 29 1969, 25 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfass
ungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 167 (F.R.G.).
22. See Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been
the Second Germanization of American Equal Protection Review, I U. PA. J. CONST. L.
284, 289 (1998) (arguing that the German Court adopted the United States Supreme
Court's "distinctive levels of scrutiny as its model for [equal protection] review
analysis"). The German Court was also following its own line of logic, especially the
proportionality principle. Id. at 289-90.
The main foreign influences on German equality jurisprudence would appear to be
those of the Swiss and United States courts. Switzerland, in particular, was a major influence,
especially during the Weimar era. The fundamental norm of binding the legislature to
equality norms was derived significantly from the jurisprudence of the Swiss federal
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A. United States Law
In the United States, the theoretical foundation for sliding scale review
comes from the famous theory of Justice Harlan Stone set forth in
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.23 Under this
theory, measures with general socio-economic components are subject to
only light brush judicial review on the theory that they entail the
formation of public policy. Public policy is the province of the political
process and, therefore, not appropriate for the judiciary in so far as there
is no glaring inequality or lack of justification for the law. Under the
formulation of Justice Stone, the purpose of the measure must be "at
least debatable ' 24 for the Court to uphold it. Under modern law, "at least
debatable" has been translated into law as a standard demanding simply
that "a legislative classification must be sustained if the classification
itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest" and the
means employed are so rationally related.'5
There have been disagreements over just what rational basis review
means. Traditionally understood, rational basis means simply that the
measure is presumptively constitutional unless there is a glaring
26irrationality to the measure. There have been disputes as to whether
the meaning of rational basis review should be determined by actual
purpose review (calling for examination of law according to purpose
identified in text), plausible purpose review (meaning government must
just have a plausible purpose for the measure, whether identified or not),
or post hoc justification (government argues to sustain measure based on
some reason arising after measure has been implemented).27 Even more
controversially, rational basis review has been applied to measures
impacting a politically powerless group that possesses an immutable
courts, as was the principle that similarly situated people should be treated the same and
that differently situated people could be treated differently. The idea of the arbitrary
norm also appears to be derived from Swiss law, which would lead to invalidation of
measures that had no valid purpose or no adequate justification. A range of other norms
were also transplanted from Switzerland. The United States Supreme Court also played
a major role in influencing the German approach to equality law. For discussion of
these points, see Konrad Hesse, Der Gleichheitsatz in der neueren deutschen
Verfassungsentwicklung, 109 ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS (AOR) 174, 177 78,
194 (1984).
23. 304 U.S. 144, 152 53 n.4 (1938).
24. Id. at 154.
25. U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
26. See id at 534 ("a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest;" accordingly, the Court
struck down the Congressional statute because it excluded from the federal food stamp
program unmarried people living together.).
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trait, in this case mental retardation.28 Accordingly, the type of review
employed in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center is commonly referred
to as rational basis with bite, meaning the type of review employed is
rational basis, but it is employed with a more substantial degree of rigor
than conventional rational basis review, as it was applied in Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
29
Beyond the low level, judicial deference accorded socio-economic
measures, Carolene Products also sets out the form of judicial review
that courts will employ to judge laws which impact vulnerable people or
fundamental rights. Under Carolene Products
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes [such as voting, expression, and political association] which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation. is to
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 30
Carolene Products sets out the judicial theory of the New Deal Court
and, in particular, the Warren Court.31 That is, in matters of governmental
use of powers entailing general socio-economic matters, the courts will
presumptively defer to the democracy, but in matters that impinge upon
fundamental rights or discrete and insular minorities, the courts will
28. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985)
(unconstitutional to deny permit for operation of a group home for mentally retarded
while granting such permits to hospitals, convalescence and old age homes, among
others).
29. 449 U.S. 456 (1981). In Minnesota Clover Leaf the Court upheld a Minnesota law
that required milk be packaged in paper, not plastic. products because the state had
provided a plausible reason (environmental) for the measure under standard rational
basis review.
30. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (citations
omitted).
31. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75 (1980).
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employ searching scrutiny. As originally conceived, searching scrutiny is
called strict scrutiny, meaning
[T]hat all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions .... 32
Today, the most rigid scrutiny has been translated into the standard of
strict scrutiny, meaning that "classifications are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests. 33 Under equal protection law, strict scrutiny applies only to
classes identified by the Court as suspect, which, as mentioned, include
only race, national origin, and alienage affected by state law. This makes
for an extremely narrow set of traits meriting extraordinary judicial review.
The spirited fights34 at the Court over what additional traits should be
classified as suspect resulted in a compromise position of listing certain
traits as not suspect but "quasi-suspect," resulting in what is now called
intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the Court has said:
"[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. ' 35
Even after Craig v. Boren, the fights over the meaning of intermediate
continued.36 Beyond gender, the Court has identified only the status of
illegitimate or nonmarital children as meriting a form of intermediate
scrutiny; 37 all other traits are classified as nonspecial and subject to
rational basis review. So we can see the Court has been extremely stingy in
applying heightened scrutiny.
32. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (upholding the detention of
Japanese Americans on the theory of deferral to military authorities in time of war).
33. Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
34. The main fight concerned gender; see, e.g.. Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S.
677 (1973).
35. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (finding that Oklahoma law that
prohibits sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one but not females is
unconstitutional).
36. Compare Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications very deferentially to uphold facial gender
inequality in a criminal statutory rape statute that made it a crime for males under 18 to
engage in sex with a minor, but not females under 18 to do the same). with United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (restoring intermediate scrutiny to a degree of
rigor by requiring that for gender differences "[t]he justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities. or preferences of males
and females.").
37. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez. 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that failure to provide
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By way of summary, we can classify American equal protection
jurisprudence as involving a sliding scale of judicial review consisting
of: (1) low level rational basis review (which itself can consist of
conventional rational basis where it is easy for government to justify the
measure to the more exacting rational basis with bite, as in Cleburne);
(2) intermediate scrutiny (applying to gender and illegitimate children);
and (3) strict scrutiny (applying to race and national origin and alienage,
but alienage only when state government is acting).
B. German Law
Turning now to German law, we also observe the Constitutional
Court's employment of sliding scale judicial review. As phrased by the
Court:
Constitutional judicial review entails a sliding scale of judicial control
(abgestufte Kontrolldichte) that grants varying ranges of legislative discretion.
When only the simple prohibition against arbitrariness (Willkfirverbot) comes
into play. a violation of article 3(1) can be established only when the lack of
substantiation of the difference in treatment evident is. By contrast, when the
Constitutional Court probes measures that impact on groups of people
differently or it impacts negatively on fundamental rights, then the disparity can
be justified only by a convincing explanation of the nature and weight of the
measure (ob ffir die vorgesehene Differenzierung Grfinde von solcher Art und
solchem Gewicht bestehen, dass sie die ungleichen Rechtsfolgen rechtfertigen
kdnnen).
At the root of the basis for sliding scale review lie also consideration of the
prospective outcomes and possible consequences of the measure. Review of
such prognosis contains different standards, from a simple evident standard (blossen
Evidenzkontrolle) to a stringent substantive review (strengen inhaltlichen Kontrolle).
Included there as considerations especially are characteristics of the present
facts and the significance of the relevant legal matter; furthermore the prognosis
discretion depends on the possibilities of the legislature to substantiate satisfactorily
the reasons for the decision in a satisfactory time frame. 3 8
38. Transsexual I, BVerfG Jan. 26, 1993. 88 BVerfGE 87 (96 97). The idea of
the prohibition against arbitrariness (Willkinrverbot) was developed by GERHARD
LEIBHOLZ in his book DIE GLEICHHEIT VOR DEM GESETZ (1925). following the Swiss
model. See Hesse, supra note 22, at 176-78, 194. For further explanation of the German
Court's use of sliding scale review, see id. at 190 92.
Equality norms first appeared in Ldnder constitutions, starting with the Napoleon
derived constitution of Westfalia in 1808, and the Bavarian constitution also of 1808.
South German Ldnder constitutions furthered the equality norm, Bavaria's of 1818,
Wuerttemburg's of 1819 and Hessen's of 1820. The 1849 St Paul's Church Constitution
concretized equality norms, but was never adopted, a consequence of the failed 1848
revolution. Later the 1850 Prussian constitution also contained equality norms, in
response to the 1848 revolution. Id. at 174 n.2. The Weimar Constitution of 1919,
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What this means is that the levels of scrutiny employed by the
Constitutional Court vary from low level testing against the arbitrariness
prohibition to intensive judicial control. The simple arbitrariness prohibition
calls only for an evident justification of the measure. This is usually
easy to meet and thus we would translate this norm into American law as
rational basis review. By contrast, the intensive judicial control outlined
in Transsexual II is akin to American strict scrutiny. Transsexual II further
provides more substance to German intense or strict scruitiny review:
[j]udicial control is tightened the more the measure impinges upon a personal
trait enumerated in article 3(3) [and also article 3(2)] and the greater the danger
that the tangible inequality leads to discrimination against a minority. The
narrower circumscription of government is not limited to personal related
differences. It applies more frequently when an inequality of factual situations
directly causes an inequality among groups of people. By only behavior
oriented differences, the level of judicial control depends on the extent to which
the person affected is in a position through his or her behavior to affect the trait
affected. In these cases, the range of legislative discretion is curtailed depending
on the degree of the inequality in treatment of persons or facts that negatively
affect the exercise of fundamental rights.
39
A different phrasing of the German form of strict scrutiny entails the
"requirement that differing affects of legal measures can be justified
only in so far as satisfaction of the problem can be justified by reasons
urgently necessary that do not entail the nature of men and women.
40
This phrasing of strict scrutiny relates to gender discrimination under
Article 3(2), but can be taken to be the substance of strict scrutiny that
applies to other suspect classes as well. The Night Worker case also
relying in substantial part on the 1849 St. Paul's Church Constitution, adopted many
equality norms, including the binding of the legislature to equality, equal rights and
duties of citizenship, marriage rights, voting rights, and equal protection for men and
women. Id. at 175-76. The Nazi time put a halt to constitutional norms, including equality.
Id. at 181. When the allies took control of Germany after World War 11. they issued
equality proclamations on October 20, 1945. Id. at 182. And then, of course, the 1949
Basic Law concretized equality norms.
Each of the constitutions of the German Ldnder contains an equality guarantee today.
Among the more interesting, is that of Brandenburg. which provides: "Each person owes
every other person respect for his or her dignity." VERF. BRANDENBURG [CONSTITUTION
OF BRANDENBURG] art. 7(2). Newer constitutions also cover homosexuality. For further
coverage of this, see Susanne Baer, Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German
Constitutional Court, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 252 (1999).
For further discussion of equality in German law, see Hans D. Jarass & Bodo Pieroth,
Grundgestz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 98 151 (6th ed. 2002); Grundgesetz.
Kommentar, art. 3 (Theodor Maunz ed. 2006); Bodo Pieroth & Bernhard Schlink,
Grundrechte Staatsrecht 11102 22 (10th ed. 1994).
39. Transsexual II, 88 BVerfGE at 96. The tougher nature of socio-economic
measures that involve a gross disparity in treatment among similarly situated groups first
appeared in BVerfG 1988, 55 BVerfGE 72. For discussion of this point, see Somek,
supra note 22, at 308-09.
40. Night Worker, BVerfG Jan. 28, 1992, 85 BVerfGE 191 (207).
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makes clear a notable difference with American law: gender classifications
are subject to strict scrutiny in Germany law whereas they are subject to
intermediate scrutiny in American law. Based purely on judicial standards,
we see that gender discrimination is a higher priority under German law
than American law. Having observed that German law contains far more
traits grouped as suspect classes than American law,4 1 we can conclude
that judicial scrutiny of immutable traits, especially those possessed by
less powerful members of society, is far more prized in Germany than
the United States.
Apart from identifiable suspect classes, strict scrutiny also applies in
German law to situations where rights other than equality are implicated.
Generally, this occurs in areas like Article 2 personality rights, 42 family
43 4
rights, or voting and citizenship rights.4 4 Combining equality norms
with other rights is akin to the substantive rights component of American
equal protection law, starting with cases like Skinner v. Oklahoma,45 and
then prominent in the Warren Court era in cases like Reynolds v. Sims,
46
or Shapiro v. Thompson.
47
When situations entail socio-economic measures, and not suspect classes,
German law applies a more deferential level of review. However,
there is a major difference between German and American law. German
law applies a sliding scale variety of judicial review to socio-economic
matters too; the rigor of the review varies with the intensity of the
inequality. The most deferential or low-level form of review is the
simple requirement that the arbitrariness prohibition not be violated. As
stated by the Constitutional Court: "When only the simple prohibition
against arbitrariness comes into play, a violation of Article 3(1) can be
established only when the lack of substantiation of the difference in
treatment evident is. ' '48 Alternatively referred to as the "evident control,"
41. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10 and infra text accompanying notes
52 53.
42. Transsexual II, 88 BVerfGE at 96-97.
43. Maternity Leave Support. BVerfG Nov. 18, 2003, 109 BVerfGE 64.
44. GG arts. 33(1), 38(1), translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE, supra note 1, at 55,
57. See also, e.g.. BVerfG Feb. 21, 1995. 92 BVerfGE 140 (151); BVerfG July 10.
1991, 84 BVerfGE 290 (298).
45. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
46. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (stating that right to vote must be based fundamentally on
norm of one person. one vote).
47. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (finding that the imposition of one year residency
requirement as precondition to obtaining welfare benefits is unconstitutional).
48. Transsexual II, BVerfG Jan. 26, 1993, 88 BVerfGE 87 (97).
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this form of judicial review is most analogous to simple rational basis
review in American law.
However, when the degree of inequality is greater concerning groups
of people or fact situations, the Constitutional Court significantly ratchets
up the rigor of its review to a more intense probing of the measure, its
impact, and the reasons for the disparity in treatment. As explained by
the Court: "By contrast, when the Constitutional Court probes measures
that impact on groups of people differently or it impacts negatively on
fundamental rights, then the disparity can be justified only by a
convincing explanation of the nature and weight of the measure., 49 The
level of this review can vary, depending on the inequality at issue; the
greater the inequality, the greater the intensity of the review. Translating
this to American law, we might characterize the review as varying from
rational basis with bite to a more intense scrutiny that might be
characterized as intermediate scrutiny. For simplicity purposes, I will refer
to the nature of this review as heightened. In this respect, it is clear that
German law is more probing generally of any inequality, even those
involving general socio-economic matters.
We will now turn to evaluating the equality jurisprudence of the
Courts. We will focus primarily on the law of the German Constitutional
Court, using Supreme Court jurisprudence as a point of comparison. We
will first evaluate cases entailing suspect traits that trigger strict scrutiny
analysis in Part II. Because gender cases are a large part of the
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, they will get separate, extended
treatment in Part III as another suspect class. We will then turn to an
evaluation of matters involving socio-economic matters, ranging from a
form of heightened scrutiny, in Part IV, to a more deferential rational
basis, in Part V.
II. STRICT SCRUTINY: TRAITS COMPRISING SUSPECT CLASSES
As observed previously, the generality of the American Constitution
does not ordinarily spell out topics for special judicial attention. Instead,
the Supreme Court determines the meaning of "equal protection of the
laws." To date, the Court has determined that only traits involving race
or national origin and alienage are suspect classes. German law also
49. Id. German law and commentators treat equality analysis as involving
proportionality, testing the relationship between ends and means. Proportionality
analysis has a long history. going back to the 1950s and an early dissent by Justice Rupp-
von Brueneck. For an explanation of this see Baer, supra note 38, at 261, 263-64.
50. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. 216 (1944).
51. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646-47 (1973) (suspect class treatment
for alienage status apply only to state governmental actions, and not federal governmental, and
only when state governmental measures cannot be justified under public function doctrine).
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demarcates race and national origin as suspect classes. By contrast, the
German Basic Law has enumerated far more traits as suspect, including
gender, "sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or
religious or political opinions" and disability. Voting rights are also treated
as meriting strict scrutiny, as they are in American law, but this is
because voting is rooted in an independent constitutional tether, although
equality norms apply as well. For now, we will focus on a sampling
of the case law of Germany, examining these cases: Illegitimate
Child Inheritance,5 2 Illegitimate Child Orphan,
5 3 Transsexual Jj, 5 4
and Handicapped Student.55
A. Illegitimate Children
Illegitimate children are singled out for special solicitude in Article
6(5) of the Basic Law, which provides: "Children born outside of
marriage shall be provided by legislation with the same opportunities for
physical and mental development and for their position in society as are
enjoyed by those born within marriage. ,56 Article 6(5) acts, in essence,
as a concretization of the core equality norm set forth in Article 3. The
inclusion of a core equality norm in other rights is common in German
law, as in voting and family rights matters, and reflects the systematization
and comprehensiveness of German jurisprudence. Under Article 6(5),
there can be no unequal treatment of illegitimate children in relation to
legitimate children. The two cases examined make this clear. In the
Illegitimate Child Inheritance, the Constitutional Court found unconstitutional,
as a violation of Article 6(5), the part of the inheritance law requiring an
illegitimate child to establish paternity of the father before the child
could establish a claim to inheritance from the father. This violated the
equality norm subsumed within Article 6(5), as no such requirement was
necessary for legitimate children. Instead, the legislature assumed that
legitimate children simply had an advantage to inheritance claims, by
reason of their birth from married parents.57
52. BVerfG Nov. 18, 1986, 74 BVerfGE 33.
53. BVerfG Jan. 29, 1969, 25 BVerfGE 167.
54. BVerfG Jan. 26. 1993. 88 BVerfGE 87.
55. BVerfG Oct. 1997, 96 BVerfGE 288.
56. GG art. 6(5), translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE. supra note 1, at 41.
57. Illegitimate Child Inheritance, 74 BVerfGE at 34, 38-39.
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Looking to Article 6(5) as the concretization of an equality norm, the
text of Article 6(5) clearly spells out that illegitimate children must be
provided with the same opportunities as legitimate children.
Article 6(5) creates a form of positive presumption in favor of illegitimate children;
conditions and necessity for any unequal treatment must be convincingly
explained and opportunities must be provided to the affected child to address
the negative consequences of the treatment so that substantive equality may be
achieved. Deviations from this rule in comparison to the rights of legitimate
children can be allowed in only two situations: First, when the formal achievement
of an equal inheritance position would also impair the protected legal position
of another person. And second, when the legal background of a certain
norm or norm complexes of the special social situation of the illegitimate child
are perceived as different. 58
Under this norm, there is no justification for the disparity in treatment
and the inheritance law was rendered void.
In a second case, Illegitimate Child Orphan,59 the Constitutional Court
found that it was unconstitutional, and a violation of Article 6(5), to
deny an illegitimate child orphan a rent subsidy of a level when the
father yet lived when such a level is granted to legitimate children. The
equality norm subsumed within Article 6(5) again demands this resolution,
as administrative officials and courts are thereby obligated "to improve
the living conditions of illegitimate children to the level of legitimate
children., 60 Against that equality norm, the lesser sum calculated as a
rent subsidy for illegitimate children in comparison to legitimate children
was unconstitutional "because the calculation for the rent subsidy
concerning the illegitimate child is made according to then existent family
and inheritance law which, in comparison to that made for legitimate
children, results in a significant disadvantage.' More fundamental
considerations also lie at the root of the inequality.
[T]he situation of an illegitimate child after the death of the father according to
current law is far worse as that for a legitimate child; a legitimate child receives
the rent subsidy as part of the inheritance from the father, at least as an
obligatory portion of the estate; furthermore, legitimate children also have the
opportunity to inherit part of the estate of the mother or father's parents estate,
which also can be used in the calculation for living expenses; and finally
legitimate children can also obtain a claim for support against the father's
relatives. All of this the illegitimate child lacks; the child only has the claim for
the rent subsidy in the limited range set out in section 1712 of the BGB
[Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch or German Civil Code]. 62
58. Id. at 39.
59. BVerfG Jan. 29, 1969, 25 BVerfGE 167.
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In short, equality demands equal treatment of children of different parental
relationships. Equal conditions and opportunities must be available to
all children, regardless of the status of their parents. What matters is the
child, not the parental relationship.
The demand for equality in treatment of children of married/unmarried
parents is fundamental to German family law. As the Constitutional
Court makes clear: "The family in the sense of Article 6(1) 63 includes
also illegitimate children; thus the relationship of an illegitimate child to
his/her mother and relatives doubtless is included in the protection of
applicable legal measures. 6 4  Thus, the welfare and development of
illegitimate children is a critical focus of the social order, as the
Constitutional Court makes clear.
Precisely because the illegitimate child is disadvantaged significantly due to the
absence of a family structure, will the constitutional order, through means of the
legal order and other state support, provide the means to rectify the inequality in
resources: illegitimate children should suffer as little as possible from being
restrained by parents or social discrimination; these children should as the
essence of their own human dignity and with their right of personality
development have the same chances, as much as possible, for their own
development and place in society as legitimate children.
65
Here too we can see another example of the integrated approach to rights
characteristic of German constitutional. In addition to the incorporation of
equality into family law, as previously observed, we also have reliance on
norms of Article 1 human dignity, Article 2 personality rights, and the
fundamental Social State obligation of Article 20(1).
Human dignity, of course, is the fundamental norm of the German
constitutional order, and all fundamental rights are radiations of it.
Article 2 personality rights operate in tandem with human dignity to
focus the constitutional order on the protection and development of
human life and personality. The Social State principle imposes positive
obligations on the state to help realize these objectives. The positive
dimension to rights in German law is a notable difference with United
States law, which requires no obligation on government to help people
achieve their lot in life. That is one reason why the German constitutional
order is generally referred to as a constitution of human dignity in
comparison to the United States constitutional order which is known as
63. "Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state." GG
art. 6(1), translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE, supra note 1, at 41.





one of liberty. Both the American and German constitutions possess
negative liberties, meaning delimitation of official power so people can
live their lives as they choose.66
In sum, we can see that the status of illegitimacy is given prime
attention in the basic charter and the German Court's jurisprudence. A
focus on creating an equal playing field for all children, no matter of
what parentage, is crucial. A person is to be valued as a person because
they are human. Their status is irrelevant. Accordingly, inequalities are
not tolerated unless there is a convincing explanation for the disparity.
Under American equal protection law, illegitimacy is subject to
intermediate scrutiny, meaning the measure can only be justified if the
classification is substantially related to a substantial governmental
interest. 67 Because intermediate scrutiny applies, there is, as the name of
the scrutiny suggests, an unevenness and unpredictability to this line of
jurisprudence. Generally, however, government may not disadvantage
illegitimate children in the dispensation of governmental benefits. 68
Furthermore, any measure that places a burden on the child solely
because the child is illegitimate cannot be justified unless it satisfies the
intermediate scrutiny test. 69 Generally, the Court has invalidated these
66. For fuller treatment of these points, see EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra
note 10, at 17 35: Edward J. Eberle. Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in
German and American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963 (1997) [hereinafter
Eberle, UTAH].
67. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (invalidating six years statute of limitations
for paternity actions by illegitimate children). Prior to Clark, the Court had applied a
form of rational basis review that judged the measure in question more harshly than
standard forms of rational basis. See, e.g.. Levy v. Louisiana. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In
Clark, the Court cemented the standard of review as intermediate scrutiny.
The Weber Court acknowledged that "imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). "[C]lassifications that burden illegitimate children for the
sake of punishing the illicit relations of their parents [are invalid], because 'visiting this
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.'" Clark, 486 U.S. at 461
(quoting Weber. 406 U.S. at 175).
68. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) ("[A] State may not
invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial
benefits accorded children generally."). See also New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v.
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (unconstitutional to deny welfare benefits to illegitimate
children while granting such benefits to legitimate children). The benefits are "as
indispensable to the health and well-being of illegitimate children as to those who are
legitimate." Id. at 621.
69. For example, the Court has rendered invalid statute of limitations shorter than
eighteen years in paternity proceedings in order to provide equal treatment to illegitimate
children. See, e.g., Clark, 486 U.S. 456; Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (invalidating
two year statute of limitations for paternity actions by illegitimate children); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (invalidating one year statute of limitations for paternity
actions by illegitimate children).
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measures unless there is a convincing explanation. Thus, treatment of
illegitimacy is roughly similar in both countries in that it merits a form
of heightened scrutiny. Two differences appear evident, however. First,
German judicial review seems more intense. Second, German law is
concerned with creating equal opportunities for illegitimate children
through forms of positive state intervention and support, which we might
view as a form of affirmative action.7 °
B. Transsexual Equal Protection II
Sex and sexuality are major topics in German law because they are
integral to personal self-definition and identity, itself the focus of
German law: the nurture and development of human personality. In the
Transsexual Case,1 the Constitutional Court determined that a male
who underwent a sex change, converting him to a female, has the right
to have official records updated to reflect the change in gender. The
question of sexual identity "belongs to the most intimate areas of personality,
where all official power is removed., 72 On a similar theme, in Transsexual
Equal Protection /73 the Court invalidated a requirement that an
individual must be twenty-five years old before sex changes can be
registered.
These themes are taken up again in the third case on transsexuality,
Transsexual Equal Protection II, where at issue was a law requiring
people who underwent sex changes to be twenty-five years old before
they can change their names in official records. The asserted purpose
behind the law was to allow people a certain amount of time to achieve a
In cases where paternity is established, an illegitimate child can inherit from the father.
See, e.g.. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977).
In adoption proceedings, the Court found that New York law that distinguished
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers violated equal protection. Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381, 385 (1979).
70. Illegitimate Child Orphan, 25 BVerfGE 167.
71. BVerfG Oct. 11, 1978, 49 BVerfGE 286. For further evaluation of the case,
see EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY. supra note 10, at 138-39 Eberle. UTAH, supra note
66, at 1031.
72. Transsexual, 49 BVerfGE at 298.
73. BVerfG Mar. 16, 1982, 60 BVerfGE 123. For further evaluation of the case,
see EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 10. at 139; Eberle. UTAH. supra note 66,
at 1031-32.
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level of maturity before the transgendered people were comfortable with
the gender change. These reasons were unacceptable to the Court.
The case concerned two people desiring to change sex from female to
male, and one from male to female. 4 Under the law, two options were
available. The big solution entailed a sex change operation. The small
solution entailed a name change, based generally on gender, without the
sex change operation. 75 The case concerned the constitutionality of the
twenty-five year age requirement before the small solution could be
pursued. As is common in German law, the case was considered under
an integrated theory of rights, most notably Article 1 human dignity and
Article 2 personality rights. But the focus of Transsexual Equal Protection
I was, of course, equality.
We have already observed that Transsexual Equal Protection II lays
out the form of sliding scale review applicable to equality, as is common
in German equal protection jurisprudence.76 The question, of course,
was under what level of scrutiny should the measure at issue be
evaluated. For the Court, this was an easy call. The measure impinged
upon a personal trait, here age and sexual identity, which also affected
personality rights.7 Accordingly, strict scrutiny applied. Under this form
of strict scrutiny,
measures that impact on groups of people differently or ... impact negatively
on fundamental rights, then the disparity can be justified only by a convincing
explanation of the nature and weight of the measure ....
[J]udicial control is tightened the more the measure impinges upon a personal
trait enumerated in Article 3(3) [and also Article 3(2)] and the greater the
danger that the tangible inequality leads to discrimination against a minority.
The narrower circumscription of government is not limited to personal related
differences. It applies more frequently when an inequality of factual situations
directly causes an inequality among groups of people.
7 8
Strict scrutiny applied to the case, the Constitutional Court determined,
because
the age limitation for the name change concerns a difference that impinges upon
a personal trait and one which has considerable affect on general personality
rights. Article 2(1) protects in conjunction with Article 1(1) [human dignity]
the narrow personal life sphere. in particular the intimate and sexual area, and
guarantees to every person the right fundamentally to determine how and in
74. Transsexual II, BVerfG Jan. 26, 1993, 88 BVerfGE 87 (92).
75. Id. at 87 88.
76. Id. at 96-97. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
77. Id. at 97. The Court decided the case under the general equality provision of
Article 3(1). Id. at 96-98. While Article 3(3) specifies that "[n]o person shall be favored
or disfavored because of sex..." the Court apparently thought that "sex" was not clearly
enough stated so as to cover transexuality. GG art. 3(3), translated in PRESS & INFO
OFFICE, supra note 1. at 40.
78. Id. at 96.
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what way to live his/her life in public. These protections serve the purpose of
the transsexuality law. The small solution [name change] allows a person in the
special situation of transexuality time to consider whether to undertake a sex
change operation and allow the person time to live in the chosen gender role
without publicly disclosing it to third parties or officials.
79
Considering the impact of the measure on the transsexuals affected, the
Court determined this measure "could only be justified under equality
norms if reasons are present of such a type and weight that the unequal
situation can be justified."8 ° The Court found no such persuasive justification
present and, therefore, found the measure unconstitutional. Evaluating
the case further, the Court observed that the twenty-five year age requirement
leads to serious burdens on those under twenty-five in that it leads to a
higher probability of irreversible transsexuality.8' Rather than helping
the person, the age limitation retards the person's development. For the
Court, a trial period in which the person can live a chosen gender identity as
they like before they undertake the dramatic step of a sex change
operation was a better solution.82
Comparing the two solutions, big and small, the Court considered the
inequality in the situations. Because of Transsexual Equal Protection I,
a person can undertake the big solution even when under twenty-five
years old. But that is not the case with the small solution. Accordingly,
the inequality in the two situations imposed a significant burden on
transsexuals; no persuasive reason was present to justify the difference.83
Thus, the twenty-five age limitation must be voided to bring it into line
with the invalidation of the twenty-five age limitation concerning the big
solution.
The purpose of the cases is to facilitate the personal development of
those contemplating a sex change. A trial period, especially at a young
age, allows the person to experience what it is like to live in a chosen
gender role on one's own terms. This will offer the person the experience
of living a chosen gender role, seeing what it is like, and gaining
experience before undertaking the big solution of a sex change. This is
especially important to those younger than 25, as that is the age where
they are most vulnerable. Gaining confidence and learning to overcome
79. Id. at 97-98.
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burdens is crucial to self-development, particularly to the young.84 Given
no credible justification for the measure, the Court rendered it void. A
twenty-five year age limitation made no sense and was outmoded.
85
Transsexuality has not been a topic of Supreme Court equal protection
jurisprudence.
C. Handicapped Student
The final Constitutional Court case involving a suspect trait other than
gender, the topic of the next section, is the Handicapped Student Case,
which concerned the rights of a student and her parents to determine if
she could stay in a regular school or whether she had to go to a special
school for disabled students to obtain the special services she needed in
order to have a successful education. 86 The student suffered from spina
bifida, a developmental birth defect involving the neural tube,87 and
wanted to be part of a normal school, integrated with other students, so
that she could live a semblance of a "normal" life. The trend, in Germany
and the European Union, is to follow just that course; integration of
handicapped students with normal students is thought to promote
confidence and mental health along with equality. 88
However, the Court ruled that school officials were justified in
sending her to the special school even against her wishes, because only
the special school could provide the educational services she needed.
The Handicapped Student Case is one of the few cases where the
government could justify its actions under the severe test of strict
scrutiny. The Handicapped Student Case is also one of first impression;
it is the first time the Court had to rule on the suspect trait of disability
since it had been added as an amendment to Article 3(3)(2) of the Basic
Law in 1994. 89 What exactly is a handicap is unclear, as even the scholarly
84. Id. at 98-99.
85. Id. at 100.
86. BVerfG Oct. 8, 1997, 96 BVerfGE 288. In the United States, the status of
being disabled would most likely be handled under some form of rational basis review.
The closest case would likely be City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985). where the Court held unconstitutional the denial of a permit for operation of
a group home for mentally retarded while granting such permits to hospitals and old age
homes.
87. Spina bifida means splint spine, in Latin; "incomplete closure of the embryonic
neural tube results in an incompletely formed spinal cord." Spina bifida-Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/spina bifida (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
88. Handicapped Student Case, 96 BVerfGE at 289 90.
89. Id. at 300-01. Later decisions concerning disability involved issues of
inheritance law, BVerfG Jan. 19, 1999. 99 BVerfGE 341 (356) and rental law,
BVerfG: Treppenhauslifteinbau zu Gunsten eines behinderten Lebensgefdihrten, 36
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRITT (NJW) 2658 59 (2000); Beaucamp, supra note 1, at
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literature does not describe it with certitude. 90 As is common in American
law, a case by case determination will ultimately clarify the meaning of
Article 3 disability. For purposes of the instant case, however, there was
certainly no question that the student was, in fact, disabled.
Faced with an issue of first impression, the Court relied on the principles
of equality jurisprudence established under Article 3 in ferreting out the
meaning of the newly added part of Article 3(3): "No person shall be
disfavored because of disability."
Article 3(3) [disability trait] relies, to be sure, on the prohibition against
discrimination of the earlier Article 3(3) and the present Article 3(3). Therein it
is clear that the protection of the general equality norm will be strengthened and
state power curtailed the more the measure impacts on certain groups of people.
as such personal traits cannot serve as the focus of measures in ways that
disadvantage or create an inequality.
91
From here, the Court recognized the explicit addition of disability to
article 3 as creating another personal trait of a suspect class variety.
As by the already demarcated traits of Article 3, such as gender, heritage,
race or language, [disability] concerns a personal trait of which a person has no
or only a limited capacity to affect.... Disability is... a trait that fundamentally
makes life more difficult in comparison to those who are nondisabled. The
special situation of disability should not lead to negative repercussions or
affirmative conditions in society so that those disabled can be integrated into society as
much as possible on terms equal to other citizens. Thus, the state can take affirmative
measures to level the playing field for the disabled, relying on the Social State principle.
The concern is achievement of substantive factual equality in society as well as formal
equality. Id.
Reliance on the Social State principle to achieve substantive justice and equality is a
development of the Basic Law. Prior to the Basic Law, the realization of social justice
was part of the equality norms of the Weimar Constitution and the Lander constitutions.
Hesse, supra note 22. at 183.
Legislative intervention to assist people with disabilities started in Europe after the end
of World War 1, designed to help returning disabled war veterans. Today. German law
has adopted a form of quota system, obligating employers to set aside a certain percentage of
jobs for those disabled. Employers who do not comply must "pay a fine or levy" that
then "goes into a fund to support the employment of disabled people." Lisa Waddington,
Reassessing the Employment of People with Disabilities in Europe. From Quotas to
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 62, 68 (1996). For a general overview of
disability law in Germany, see Martin Kock, Disability Law in Germany: An Overview
of Employment, Education and Access Rights, 5 GERMAN L. J. 1373 (2004), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf!Vol05Nol 1/PDF Vol 05 No 11 1373-1392_Private
Kock.pdf.
90. Handicapped Student Case, 96 BVerfGE at 301.
91. Id. at 302.
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exclusions in society nor legal situations. Such negative repercussions must be
prevented or overcome.
92
Because of the especially disadvantaged status of disabled people, the
Court made some adjustment to equality norms. No impairment of the
disabled may be tolerated, but preferences may be allowed, in a form of
affirmative action. "Only disadvantages of the disabled are prohibited.
Advantages designed to equalize the relationship of disabled to
nondisabled people are allowed, at least if not inconsistent with
constitutional norms. 93 The goal of the Court, as is clear, is to try to the
extent possible to create a level playing field for those most disadvantaged
in society so they have an opportunity to live their lives and reach their
potential on the same terms as others. Certainly, this is a special concern
for the disabled, as they are in one of the weakest positions to affect their
fates. Underscoring this aim are some of the fundamental norms of the
German constitutional order: the rights of dignity, personality, and
equality and the commitment to the Social State. Securing human welfare
for all people is a preeminent goal of German constitutional law.
The Court then proceeded to focus on how burdens or prejudice can
arise in society as concerns the disabled.
An impairment can exist ... not only through rules or measures that make the
situation of a disabled person worse as, for example, lack of access to public
facilities or the denial of services that are available to everyone else. Much
more can an impairment occur through exclusion from development and career
opportunities that cannot be accessed due to lack of necessary support services
for the handicapped.
94
How to answer this question is, of course, difficult because the answer is
dependent on the factual situation, the views of experts, and the state of
technology, among other factors.95 What is clear, however, is that the
state has a special responsibility with respect to the disabled.96 Special
judicial solicitude is accorded those most vulnerable in society.
Turning to evaluation of the facts and special nature of the case, the
Court acknowledged that the government has significant discretion,
under Article 7, to set educational policy, including over special education.
Still, government discretion here is limited by the equality norms of
Article 3. Further, the student's Article 2 personality rights, and her
family's Article 6 family rights were also at issue, as was the state's
special obligation to care for the handicapped under the Social State
principle, forming quite a constellation of constitutional norms for the
92. Id.
93. Id. at 302-03.
94. Id. at 303.
95. Id.
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Court to consider. 97 In light of all of these factors, the Court observed
that whether a disabled student could be transferred to a special school
essentially depends on availability of adequate resources. If sufficient
resources are present at a regular school, then no transfer can be made to
a special school without violating equality. However, if adequate
resources are not available at a regular school, then a transfer to a
special school can be made, even against the wishes of the student and
parents.9 8 Only in such a situation can a disabled person have the
resources available to achieve personal capacities as much as possible.
Still, because disability is a suspect trait, only a strict scrutiny
rationale could justify such a transfer to a special education school. As
observed by the Court, any such transfer calls for "an extremely
convincing explanation." 99 Here, the burden placed on the student must
be "substantially grounded" and persuasively articulated. 100 Stated
differently, the transfer can be justified only pursuant to a "restricted
[intense] judicial review."'1' 1 Applying the strict scrutiny standard,
and considering the range of factors at issue-educational policy and
resources, student and parental choice, the special status of disability and
the severity of the condition, and the rationale that lies at the base of the
transfer decision-the Court upheld the school officials' decision to
transfer the student to the special education school because, as stated
by school officials, the resources and services simply were not present at
the regular school and the education of the student could only be
enhanced at a special education school. 10 2 Handicapped Student thus
represents the rare case where the decision could be justified under strict
scrutiny.
Under United States law, the status of disability merits no special
judicial solicitude. The closest Supreme Court case is City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, where the Court spoke of the relative social
and political powerless of the mentally retarded, but nevertheless applied
97. Id. at 303-04.
98. Id. at 307.
99. Id. at 310.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 311.
102. Id. at 310, 314. For example. the opinion of educational experts determined
that the student needed at least five hours of individual instruction in math and also
significant individual instruction in science and other classes. These types of services




rational basis review to invalidate the city's denial of a building permit
for a home for the mentally retarded.
103
III. GENDER DISCRIMINATION: STRICT SCRUTINY
Gender is demarcated as a trait meriting special attention in Article
3(2), which provides: "Men and women shall have equal rights. The
state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women
and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist." An
amendment adopted in 1994 now obligates the state "to support and
promote gender equality."'10 4 From the text of Article 3(2), we can discern
both the concern for gender equality and the concomitant commitment
of the constitutional order to affirmative state action to realize that objective
through the principle of the Social State. The state is obligated to
create conditions that promote equality in society, principles we have
previously recognized in cases like Transsexual Equal Protection 115
and Handicapped Student.10 6 The explicit, proactive obligation of the state
to achieve substantive equality rooted in Article 3(2) creates a textual
rooting of affirmative state action, which has been a major focus of
German law. 
107
Eradicating gender discrimination has been a high priority of the
Constitutional Court, forming a major reason why the trait triggers strict
scrutiny in contrast to the intermediate scrutiny available under United
States law.1°8 For the Constitutional Court, what is at issue is simply
103. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
104. GG art. 3(2), translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE supra note 1, at 40. Justice
Renate Jaeger. The Federal Constitutional Court: Fifty Years of the Struggle for Gender
Equality, 2 GERMAN L.J. 2 (2001), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/
article.php?id 35. The political impact of women's groups was an important influence
in the adoption of the amendment. Id.
105. BVerfG Jan. 26. 1993, 88 BVerfGE 87.
106. 96 BVerfGE 288.
107. For discussion of the Constitutional Court's approach to affirmative action for
gender, mainly women, see Blanca Rodriguez Ruiz and Ute Sacksofsky, Gender in the
German Constitution, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 149, 156 59
(BEVERLY BAINES & RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005), available
at http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/23364/sample/9780521823364ws.pdf For discussion of
gender equality in Germany, see Monica Bhattacharyya, From Aondifferentiation to Factual
Equality: Gender Equality Jurisprudence Under the German Basic Law, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 915 (1996).
108. The concern for gender equality has a long history in Germany. It began with
the 1919 Weimar Constitution, which was based in significant part on the 1849
Paulskirche Constitution, which arose from the failed 1848 revolution. Among other
provisions, the Weimar Constitution guaranteed women the right to vote, in Articles 17
and 22. the rights and duties of equal citizenship, in Article 109(2). equality in issues of
marriage, in Article 119(2), and no exclusion of women from the civil service, in Article
128(2). Interestingly, around the same time, in 1920, women achieved the right to vote
in the United States with the adoption of the 19th amendment to the Constitution.
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gender discrimination itself; it does not matter if the discrimination affects
women or men. The Constitutional Court has been in the field of gender
discrimination long before the Supreme Court.10 9
A. Men Housekeepers
In Men Housekeepers,110 the case concerned whether men could
obtain the same benefits accorded to women: one paid day off per month to
take care of housekeeping duties. Here, a single man worked as a nurse."'
The Court ruled that men should be accorded the same benefits as
women.
1 12
The movement for gender equality was stilled somewhat, with the Nazi takeover in
1933. The Nazi period formed a big impetus for the explicit gender provisions in Article
3 of the Basic Law.
The 1949 Constitution of the German Democratic Republic (or East Germany) also
guaranteed equality of gender. Article 7 guaranteed equality of the sexes: Article 18(4)
guaranteed equal salaries; and the 1968 Constitution guaranteed equal rights "in all areas
of social, state and personal lives." in Article 20(2).
The Constitutional Court has gone through a number of phases in interpreting Article 3
equality provisions to gender. The jurisprudence of the 1950s and 1960s emphasized6natural distinctions between men and women;" these would mainly be biological. In
the 1970s and early 1980s, the Court turned to emphasizing formal equality between the
sexes. Then, in the 1980s, the Court emphasized substantive equality, obligating the
state to enact forms of affirmative action to equalize conditions between men
and women. Jaeger, supra note 104, 3; Blanca Rodriguez Ruiz and Ute Sacksofsky,
Gender in the German Constitution. supra note 107. at 153 55.
State or Ldnder Constitutions also have a history, at least as long as 1949, in
guaranteeing gender equality. The state of Bavaria was the least solicitous of women in
contrast to most of the other states, like North Rhein Westfalia, Bremen and Hessen,
which set out many equality protections based on gender.
For detailed treatment of these points, see Ingwer Ebsen, Gleichberechtigung von
Maennern und Frauen in I-ANDBUCH DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSRECHTS 263, 263 67.
290 (Ernst Benda, Werner Maihofer, & Hans-Jochen Vogel eds., 2d ed. 1995).
109. See David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad. Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. 333, 364 ("Article
117(1) gave legislatures until 1953 to eliminate gender distinctions from the civil code
and other laws, but in that year the Constitutional Court affirmed its authority to strike
down nonconforming provisions as soon as the grace period expired" (citing 3 BVerfGE
225, 237-48 (1953)). Article 117(1) of the Basic Law provided: "Law which is
inconsistent with paragraph (2) of Article 3 of this Basic Law shall remain in force until
adapted to that provision, but not beyond March 31, 1953." GG art. 117(1), translated in
PRESS & INFO OFFICE supra note 1. at 102. By contrast, in the United States, the earliest
Supreme Court striking down a law based on gender discrimination was Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
110. BVerfG Nov. 13, 1979, 52 BVerfGE 369.
111. Id. at 370.




Relevant to the Court was simply whether men and women shared the
same burden of work and housekeeping duties.11 3 The law here was
based "only on a gender difference and thereby created a constitutionally
impermissible difference."'1 14 Grounding the law on a difference in gender
was simply not an adequate constitutional justification. Any such gender
difference could only be justified by a "notable basis for the difference
in law."'1 15 No such justifiable difference was present here, as "the double
burden of work and housekeeping duties can weigh on men just as
severely as on women. This is especially the case for single people, who
must maintain their own household." '116 There simply is no biological
reason to justify the disparate treatment.117 To rely on the idea that only
women are suited to perform housekeeping duties or that women are of
a weaker constitution than men is to engage in stereotyping. 118 Nor
can the law be justified by a difference in social function between the
sexes. 119 Applying the command of Article 3(2), men and women must
be treated the same under this law because there was no persuasive
justification for the disparate treatment. 120
In sum, the Court carefully evaluated all the reasons presented for the
preference given to women in obtaining a paid day off in order to take
care of housekeeping duties and found them wanting. The law could not
be justified by reason of gender difference, weaker physical constitution,
biological difference, or social and functional differences. 121 Accordingly,
there was no sound explanation for the difference in gender treatment;
the law was stuck down as unconstitutional, and sent back to the
legislature for reconfiguration. 122 The bottom line for the Court is that a
difference in treatment of gender can only be based on "objective
113. Id. at 375-77.
114. Id. at 374. The origins of the law went back to 1939, with the goal of lessening
the burdens of work on women, especially mothers, so that they could devote more of
their time to child rearing. The thought was lesser work time would allow more time for
house keeping and child rearing duties. Id. at 375.
115. Id. at 374.
116. Id. at 375. A 2004 European study revealed that, in Germany, women
perform four hours and eleven minutes of housekeeping duties per day as compared to
two hours and twenty one minutes by men. Press Release, Eurostat, Das Leben der
Frauen und Maenner in der EU25 aus Sicht der Statistik [The Life of the Women and
Men in the EU25 from the View of the Statistics] 29/2009 (Mar. 6, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/j ustice-home/news/information-dossiers/international-womens-day_
06/ statistics men women de 06.pdf.
117. Men Housekeepers, 52 BVerfGE at 375. A condition like pregnancy would be
an example of a valid biological difference between men and women. Ingwer Ebsen,
supra note 107, at 277.
118. Men Housekeepers, 52 BVerfGE at 376.
119. Id. at376 77.
120. Id. at 378.
121. Id. at 376 78.
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biological and functional (work related) differences based on the nature
of the present life relationship between men and women."' 2 3 Of these
factors, biological differences are rare and will be hard to use as a basis
for gender difference. Pregnancy-a condition women can have, but not
men-would be one example. Of course, gender stereotype will simply
not work. Thus, the main avenue to justify gender difference will be social
or other function; but this too will call for a very persuasive justification
that will be quite hard to make. 24
In Men Housekeepers, the benchmarks of gender equality jurisprudence
are clear. Men and women must be treated equally. Differences in
treatment call for a convincing explanation based on biological or functional
differences. Stereotypical gender roles are not to be tolerated in modern
society. Gender myths and traditions must be eradicated. The cases
that follow Men Housekeepers build upon these principles in tightening
and clarifying the standard of review to be applied to gender discrimination.
The threshold case is Night Worker. 125  Night Worker concerns the
Court's strong commitment to equalize job and social opportunities for
men and women. Night Worker involves women, as do the next set of
cases as well, Machinist26 and Firefighter. 127
B. Night Worker
Night Worker concerned the constitutionality of a law that prohibited
women from working at night. The case was the opposite of Men
Housekeepers; here women were barred from performing duties that
men could perform while in Men Housekeepers, men were excluded
from benefits available to women. The difference in treatment of gender
made no difference to the Court; gender discrimination is gender
discrimination; it hardly matters whether it affects men or women.
Thus, the law was found unconstitutional, as in Men Housekeepers. The
case is not notable in the outcome reached. Rather, it is notable for the
clarification of the level of scrutiny to be applied to gender discrimination
and the goal of the Court in creating equal conditions in society for both
genders. Night Worker marked a decisive shift in the jurisprudence of the
Court; the Court shifted from focusing only on biological or functional
123. Id. at 374.
124. For further discussion of this, see Ingwer Ebsen, supra note 107. at 280 81.
125. BVerfG Jan. 28, 1992, 85 BVerfGE 191.
126. BVerfG Nov. 16, 1993, 89 BVerfGE 276.




differences to considering the conditions in society so that men and women
could compete on a level playing field. The Court is now concerned as
much with achieving substantive as well as formal equality.
The facts of the case concerned a manager of a bakery. She herself
did not work at night. However, her employees did, most of whom were
women. 128 The intriguing aspect of the case was that the plaintiff was suing
not under Article 3 equality norms, but instead under Article 2 rights to
general freedom of action.129 Yet, since her female employees who worked
at night were in violation of the law barring women from night work, the
plaintiff was fined and, therefore, could allege a violation of her Article 2
rights based on her employees' discrimination under Article 3. This is
another example of the radiating effect of one fundamental right on another,
a version of the Third Party Effect Theory.13 °
Another intriguing aspect of German jurisprudence is that it also
involves the influence of European law. Under the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, enforcing the European Convention
on Human Rights, member states must comply with European human
rights norms. Here the European Court had ruled that men and women
must be treated equally; accordingly, there can be no prohibition on night
work for women. 131 In effect, member states like Germany are subject
128. The Work Time Regulation law prohibited women from working between
20:00 and 6:00 on weekdays. and 20:00 and 5:00 on days before Sundays and holidays.
Night Worker, 85 BVerfGE at 193. A 1989 empirical study showed that about 478,000
females worked at night, around 7.6% of all female employees. Id. at 195.
129. Article 2 personality freedoms contain a number of dimensions, including the
ability to act in the world as one chooses. A representative case is Elfes, BVerfG Jan. 16.
1957, 6 BVerfGE 32, which dealt with the denial of a visa for foreign travel of a right-
wing critic. The Constitutional Court ruled that the denial of the visa violated the man's
general personality rights. For extended discussion of this dimension of German law,
see EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY. supra note 10, at 62 74; Eberle, UTAH. supra note
66, at 981-90.
130. Night Worker, 85 BVerfGE at 196. 205 06. For discussion of the Third Party
Effect theory, see infra note 150 and text accompanying.
131. Night Worker. 85 BVerfGE. at 203-04 (citing and discussing ECHR Decision
of July 25, 1991, based on European Common Market Directive of February 9, 1976).
The equalizing of conditions for men and women has been an EU project of long-
standing. Under the comparable worth doctrine of the EU, men and women must be
paid equally for like jobs. The policy started with an EEC 1975 directive. Council
Directive 75/117/EEC, 1975 O.J. (L 045) 19.
In Germany, the gender pay gap has narrowed. In 2000, women earned 21.5% less than
men. In 2005, the gender gap narrowed to 20.2%, a small step forward. See Institute of
Economic and Social Research (WSI), Narrowing of Gender Pay Gap (May 5, 2006),
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/04/articles/deO604019i.html. By contrast, the
gender pay gap in the United States, in 2002, was 23.8%. Amy Caiazza. April Shaw &
Misha Werschkul, Women ' Economic Status in the States: Wide Disparities by Race, Ethnicity,
and Region p. 5. (INST. FOR WOMEN'S POL. RES.). available at http://www.
iwpr.org/pdf R260.pdf.
Up to the age of 30, educational and career opportunities for women are nearly equal




[VOL. 10: 63, 2008] Equality in Germany and the United States
SAN DIEGO INT' LL.J.
to two constitutional orders: European and national. This is a form of
supra-national federalism, one that has been the subject of a wide set of
notable and sometimes controversial cases.
32
positions as men. However, the equality drops off after age 30. mainly due to the birth
of children. See German Embassy Ottawa, Women in Germany, http://www.ottawa.diplo.
de/Vertretung/ottawalen!06/Lifestyle culture/seite women.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2008)
Statistsches Bundesamt Deutchland [German Federal Statistical Office], http://www.destatis.
de/allg/e/veroe/blickpkt women.htm.
The EEC then adopted a 1976 directive on the equal treatment of men and women.
Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L.039) 40. The equal treatment of men and
women is now regulated by Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council.
See Council Directive 2002/73, 2002, O.J. (L. 269) (EC). For evaluation of these
measures, see Susanne Hoentzsch, Discrimination in Individual-Related Employment
A iew from Europe and Germany to Canada, Analyzing the Requirements and the
Background of the European Anti-Discrimination Directives, 7 GERMAN L.J. 795 (2006),
available at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/pdf/Vol07Nol0/PDF Vol 07 No 10 795-
818 Articles Hoentzsch.pdf
In Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3051. [1996]
1 C.M.L.R. 175, the European Court of Justice ruled that Bremen's requirement that
automatically gave priority to women in sections where they are underrepresented (not
making up at least one-half of the staff) when both male and female candidates were
equally qualified was incompatible with then Council Directive 76/207.
The European Court of Justice also found the German ban on women rendering
military service to be in violation of the EU equality directive. Accordingly. Germany
amended the Basic Law to now provide, in Article 12(a)(4) that "1f during a state of
defense, the need for civilian services in the civilian health system or in stationary
military hospitals cannot be met on a voluntary basis, women between the ages of
eighteen and fifty-five may be called upon to render such services by or pursuant to a
law. They may under no circumstances be required to bear weapons." GG art. 12(a)(4),
translated in PRESS & INFO OFFICE supra note 1. This means, effectively, that women
can now serve in the armed forces, but not with weapons. See Renate Jaeger, supra note
104, 17; Karen Raible, Compulsory Military Service and Equal Treatment of Men and
Women Recent Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court
of Justice (Alexander Dory v. Germany). 4 GERMAN L.J. 299. 300 (2003).
132. See, e.g. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1
(2005), which found the Princess Caroline Case, BVerfG Dec. 15, 1999, 101 BVerfGE
361, incompatible with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
German Constitutional Court found that Basic Law article 5 expressive freedoms
outweighed the privacy interests of Princess Caroline when she appeared in the public.
But the European Court of Human Rights found, instead, that ECHR article 8 privacy
and family rights trumped expressive freedoms.
The battle between the German Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice for the
European Union began in a series of cases involving the applicability of human rights to
the integration of German and European law. The German Basic Law, of course.
has a strong and systematic set of human rights, as we have observed. However, the
European legal order does not yet have direct applicability of a human rights catalogue,
owing in part to the difficulties of European integration and adoption of a European
Constitution. Today, Europe has two legal orders, that of the European Union and of the




Turning now to the case, the Court clarified the standard of review for
gender discrimination.
[N]o one may be disfavored or favored on the basis of sex. [This norm of equality]
reinforces the general equality provision of Article 3(1), in that the range of
discretion available to the legislator is narrower. Gender fundamentally may
not be used as the basis for a law resulting in unequal treatment, like the other
demarcated traits of Article 3(3). That applies also not only when the measure
does not result in an Article 3(3) equality prohibited inequality, but also when
other goals are pursued. 
133
The Court then went on to clarify the content of gender equality norms.
Article 3 norms require equality, and these norms extend to social reality as
well. The sentence "Men and women shall have equal rights" means not only
that legal norms that favor or disfavor gender traits will be abolished, but also
sets out to accomplish an equality of the sexes in the future. Equality norms are
directed at achieving equal life relationships. Women must have the same
career opportunities as men. Overcoming stereotypical roles that create higher
burdens or other disadvantages for women are not always successfully achieved
through state measures. Factual disadvantages that typically affect women can
be ameliorated through the equality norms of Article 3.134
The Court was recognizing that equality norms apply not only to legal
measures but also the conditions of social reality. Equality is more than
just a legal norm; it is a transformative social principle as well. A
measure of substantive social equality must proceed in conjunction with
The squabble between the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of
Justice begin over enforcement of human rights. In a series of cases referred to as
Solange ("so long as"), the German Constitutional Court essentially said that European
law applied in Germany "so long as" the European law was compatible with the basic
rights set out in the Basic Law. In the first case, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH
v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fuer Getreide und Futtermittlel (Solange 1), 1974, 37
BVerfGE 271, 2 C.M.L.R. 540, the German Court concluded that the European Court of
Justice had competence to decide issues of European law, but that German human rights
law would apply in Germany, notwithstanding the European Court's ruling, insofar as
European law was not compatible with German human rights.
In the second case, Application of Wuensche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange 11). 1987,
73 BVerfGE 339, 3 C.M.L.R. 225, the German Court was more accommodating to
European law, as the human rights situation had improved in the European Union. Still.
the German Court reserved the right to make final judgments on human rights, under
German law, insofar as European law was not up to the standards of German law.
In the final case of the triad, Manfred Brunner et al. v. The European Union Treaty
(Solange 111). 1994. 88 BVerfGE 155. 1 C.M.L.R. 57, the German Court again reserved
its authority to challenge European law insofar as European law did not meet the
standards of German human rights law.
For extended treatment of these cases and issues, see Mark Killian Brewer, The European
Union and Legitimacy: Time for a European Constitution. 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 555
(2001).
What this battle indicates is that European integration is still a struggle and that there
are parallel-national and European-legal orders that are not, as yet, totally integrated.
133. Night Worker. 85 BVerfGE at 206.
134. Id. at 207.
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formal legal equality in order to achieve true equality in society. 35 In
other words, the state is obligated to act proactively, in the form of affirmative
actions, to equalize social conditions between men and women. There
must be an "adjustment of social roles and relationships" and the "dismantling
of social disadvantages."' 136 Applying these norms to the facts at hand,
the Court observed that the case did not entail an equalizing of relations
but rather the rectification of a legal inequality. While the law impacts
employers, the consequence of the law is that it disadvantages women in
comparison to men. Men can work at night, but not women. "That leads to
a legal inequality.' 3
At issue was whether the inequality could be justified. Here the Court
explained, "[n]ot every inequality that impinges upon gender violates
Article 3(3). Different treatment under rules can often be permissible in
so far as they lead to solution of a problem based on the nature of a man
or a woman that are urgently necessary."'138  The Court stated the
standard in a different way as well under Article 3(1): "The general
equality norm of Article 3(1) forbids the legislature to treat different
group traits differently in legal measures, when the difference cannot be
justified by sufficient type and weight."' 139 This is another example of
the interlocking nature of Article 3 norms.
Here the case could not meet that strict threshold, as the Court went on
to explain. Night work is detrimental to everyone, the Court observed.
It can lead to insomnia, loss of appetite, upset stomach, agitation and
nervousness, among other conditions. There is no medical data to document
135. For detailed discussion of the nature of this gender based affirmative action,
see Ingwer Ebsen, supra note 107, at 270-74, 281-86 (German Court is concerned with
achieving factual and social equality in addition to legal equality, aiming to achieve de
facto equality. The Court is concerned with eradicating all legal barriers that hamper
women. One problem. however, is that utilizing gender affirmative action results in
placing burdens on men who are not responsible for earlier inequalities suffered by
women. Still, the Court is concerned with overcoming gender stereotypes in society).
Forms of gender affirmative action also exist in the Ldnder, see id. at 276-77.
In a case involving retirement benefits, the Court ruled that women could opt to retire
earlier than men to compensate for past discrimination. BVerfG Jan. 28, 1987, 74
BVerfGE 163.
In addition to gender, the Court also applies forms of affirmation action to traits of
illegitimate children and disability, again relying on the Social State principle. See
Beaucamp, supra note 1, at 1001.
136. Night Worker, 85 BVerfGE at 209.
137. Jd. at 207.
138. Id.




the fact it affects women more than men. Medical data only shows that
night work can more detrimentally affect those that have to do
housework and child rearing. This affects the body's biorhythms. 140 But
that is the case for men (single men and married men who share
housekeeping and child rearing duties with their spouse) as well as those
who are also faced with the dual burden of job and home, as the Men
Housekeepers Case makes clear. There is no gender basis for the disparate
treatment. Instead, the difference speaks to gender stereotype.
14 1
A further reason given for the law was that night work can be more
dangerous to women, on account of crime or other dangers. This too the
Court rejected. Instead, "the state should fulfill its obligation to protect
women from physical attacks on public streets, and not renege on its
commitments, so that women's job opportunities will not be curtailed by
working nights. 142 The Court went on to suggest that the state could
provide bus service to transport women from home to work at night for
safety reasons. 143 Here again, we can observe the influence of the Social
State principle: the state must take measures to secure the welfare of its
citizens.
The Court then went on to observe that the prohibition on night work
for women would lead to a serious decline of their educational and job
opportunities, which in turn would cause a worsening of the position of
women in society and the further perpetuation of gender stereotypes. 144
Thus, prohibiting night work would worsen, not benefit, women's lot.
For all these reasons, the measure offered no persuasive justification of
the difference in treatment of women versus men and was, therefore,
unconstitutional.
C. Machinist
Machinist concerned the application of a woman to be a machinist, a
traditionally male trade. 145 In this respect, Machinist had parallels to
Night Worker in eradicating gender stereotypes, here male roles. Not
surprisingly, European law also applied, as a European Union law required
140. Id. at 207-08.
141. Id. at 208.
142. Id. at 209.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 210.
145. Only 1% of machinists are women. BVerfG Nov. 16, 1993, 89 BVerfGE. 276
(291). The German word is Maschinenschlosserin, which could be translated as mechanic or
machinist. It appeared she was a trained machinist, having previously completed her
education as a school teacher. Id. at 279.
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that men and women must be given equal chances in job applications.
4 6
The woman was the only female applicant out of forty; only eight were
given interviews, but not she. She was denied an interview because the
employer thought that the job of machinist was not appropriate for a
woman, as it was too physically demanding.
147
Applying now standard norms developed in Night Worker, the Court
observed that discrimination based on gender is impermissible, that
equality norms apply to society and social conditions as well as legal
measures, and that they apply prospectively as well as to present
conditions. The overall goal is realization of gender equality in society,
both formally and substantively.148 In this respect, the German Constitutional
Court is far more proactive than the United States Supreme Court.
Because Machinist involved an employer-employee relationship in the
private sector, German constitutional norms applied through the theory
of Third Party Effect (Drittwirkung). Under Third Party Effect, the values
of the Basic Law radiate out and influence interpretation of private
law. The effect can also go the other way; private law norms can
influence interpretation of constitutional norms, known as the theory of
Reciprocal Effect (Wechselwirkung). 149  Given that the dispute was a
private law matter, the Constitutional Court effectively reviewed the
ordinary courts' interpretation of constitutional norms, here equality.
146. Id. at 277 (citing European Union law that was incorporated into the section
611 of the German Civil Code (BGB)).
147. Id. at 279.
148. Id. at 285.
149. The decisive case is Pith, BVerfG Feb. 1. 1995. 7 BVerfGE 198, which
involved a communication rights dispute over the right of a film director formerly
closely associated with the Nazis to show his new films at a Hamburg film festival. In
overturning an injunction prohibiting Ltith from continuing his boycott of the film, the
Court delineated the value order of the GG. "This value-system, which centers upon
human dignity and the free unfolding of the human personality within the social
community, must be looked upon as a fundamental constitutional decision affecting all
areas of law, public and private .... Thus, basic rights obviously influence civil law
too." Id. at 205.
By interpreting basic rights as establishing an "objective" order of values, the Court
was stating that those values are so important that they must exist "objectively" as an
independent force, separate from their specific manifestation in a concrete legal
relationship. So conceived, objective rights form part of the legal order, the orde public,
and thereby possess significance for all legal relationships.
For further consideration of the Third Party Effect Theory. see Edward J. Eberle.,
Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 797, 811-12
(1997); Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory,
48 MD. L. REv. 247, 261 (1989).
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Ordinary courts must recognize the influence of constitutional norms. In
this case, equality demanded that men and women must be treated equally
in job opportunities. 15 So in reviewing the decision of the ordinary
court, the Constitutional Court concluded that the ordinary court had not
taken adequate cognizance of Article 3 equality norms. The ordinary
court did not adequately consider the burden imposed on women in the
workplace. 151 Thus, the case resulted in a violation of Article 3, which
requires that a decision cannot be based solely on gender. 152 Gender
based decisions are unconstitutional, notwithstanding justifications




Firefighter case involved an issue similar to that in Machinist: the
exclusion of women from the workforce. 154 In this case, the states of Bavaria
and Baden-Wiierttemberg limited membership in fire departments to men
only, a policy consistent with many German states. 155 As a peculiar
measure, the states of Bavaria, Baden-Wfierttemberg, and Saxony raised
the amount of a special tax fee used to support the fire department on
those residents who did not serve in the fire service. The tax surcharge
was applied only to male residents, not female. Of course, all these
states employed only men as firefighters. 156 The Constitutional Court
declared both measures unconstitutional.
150. Machinist, 89 BVerfGE at 285.
151. Id. at 286.
152. Id. at 288.
153. Id. at 288-89.
154. BVerfG Jan. 24, 1995. 92 BVerfGE 91.
155. The German states of Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), Rheinland-Pflaz, and
Thueringen allow women to serve in fire departments. Id. at 94. There are also volunteer
fire departments in the country. Women commonly serve in volunteer fire departments.
Ironically, Bavaria has the largest number of female volunteer firefighters, although
females comprise only 2.6% of the force. Eastern German states have the largest
percentage of female volunteer firefighters, with Sachsen-Anhalt having the largest
percentage at 14%. Overall, female firefighters comprise about 4% of firefighters in
Germany. Id. at 111.
156. Id. at 94. Thueringen also raised the special firefighter fee, applying it only to
men residents. But Thueringen allowed both males and females into the fire department.
The Baden-Wuerttemberg measure had come up twice before. In the first case, the
Constitutional Court ruled that the special fee was unconstitutional as a violation of the
equality provisions of Article 3(1). See BVerfGe June 1, 1956, 9 BVerfGE 285 (291). A
reformulated version of the measure was upheld in the second case on the ground that it
applied only to men of a certain age. BVerfG May 15, 1959, 13 BVerfGE 162 (167).
Given the Firefighter case, it is hard to imagine how the second decision would withstand
scrutiny today.
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As is now common in the constitutional law of member states,
European norms apply to issues before member states' constitutional courts.
Such was the case in Firefighter, as the European Court of Human
Rights (ECRH) ruled that no one could be forced to perform fire fighting
duties. 57 While the ECHR decision did not directly address the issue
before the Constitutional Court, the underlying principles of equality
were taken into account by the Court.'58
Applying the now standard delineation of the intensive form of review
spelled out in Night Worker, the Constitutional Court observed that
gender based differences could only be justified by an absolutely
compelling reason based on biological, natural, or functional gender
differences. The equality provisions apply to social reality and not just
legal measures, as we have also observed in Night Worker. The addition
of the explicit gender equality provision in Article 3(2) makes these
principles clear. In the Firefighter case, the inequality could only be
justified by the influence of other constitutional rights, but that was not
the case.' 59
Considering the facts pointing against the gender equality standard,
the Court found no reasons to justify the exclusion of women from fire
departments. "There are no compelling reasons on which to limit
service in fire departments to men only, in order to address problems
that arise on account of the nature of either men or women. Today, there
simply is no sound basis on which to exclude women from fire
departments based on their physical constitution." 160 Examining the
medical data, the Court observed that fire fighting is hazardous due to
exposure to heat, smoke, and the burden of carrying heavy equipment.161
All of these factors can jeopardize health, including loss of strength and
lower blood circulation.162 There is a certain case to be made that these
dangers affect women more than men. 163 But these gender based differences
are still not persuasive enough reasons to justify the total exclusion of
women from firefighting. Women can be tested as well as men to see if
157. Firefighter, 92 BVerfGE at 107-08 (citing ECHR judgment of July 18, 1994).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 109. The main other right here involved was Article 12 occupational
freedoms the Court found no basis in article 12 to justify the exclusion of women from
fire departments. Id. at 111- 12.
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they can perform firefighting duties. 164 Testing procedures should control,
not gender derived differences. The gender-based treatment of firefighters
is even less persuasive because women in fact join volunteer fire
departments. 165 Further, with the enhanced technology available and the
now common sharing of duties, firefighting is less physically demanding
than in the past. Of course, certain exceptions can be made for pregnant
women or new mothers.
166
Uncovering the basis of all these justifications for excluding women,
the Court concluded, that the justifications revealed nothing other than
gender stereotype; the idea that women were not capable of performing
firefighting work. This reasoning is simply unacceptable as measured
against the equality norms of Article 3, which are designed to achieve




A final gender equality case worth considering is Maternity Leave,
which involved the disparity in paying contributions for maternity leave
for small employers (under twenty employees) as compared to larger
employers. 16 8 Payment for maternity leave is required in Germany, all
other western countries, and almost all other countries, except the United
States.169 In Germany, women get six weeks before delivery and eight
weeks after delivery of children as maternity leave. 170  Payment for
164. Id. at 110.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 112.
168. BVerfG Nov. 18, 2003, 109 BVerfGE 64 (2003).
169. Basic Instincts: Paid Leave for Maternity Is the Norm, Except In .
N.Y.TMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at C6 ("170 countries offer some paid maternity leave, and 98
of them offer at least 14 weeks off with pay. The United States is not one of them." The
United States is one of only four countries with no paid maternity leave; the others being
Liberia, Papua New Guinea and Swaziland).
170. Maternity Leave, 109 BVerfGE at 65. The constitutional basis for maternity
leave is rooted in the Article 6 family law protections, which provide, in relevant part:
"(1) Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state. (2)
The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a duty
primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over them in the
performance of this duty .... (4) Every mother shall be entitled to the
protection and care of the community." GG art. 6, translated in PRESS & INFO
OFFICE supra note 1, at 41.
The legislature has significant discretion in fixing the fiscal amount and nature of
maternity leave to be accorded women. However, protection of the mother takes precedence
over all other considerations. This is part of the Social State obligation of the state,
under Article 6. Maternity Leave. 109 BVerfGE at 85 87. In essence, the State wants to
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maternity leave is a shared cost between employers and the government,
but since 1968, more of the cost burden has been shifted to employers.'
That was the issue in this case. Small employers employing less than
twenty employees participated in a pool of similarly situated employers
in which a calculation of costs was made and assessed. Employers with
more than twenty employees did not participate in this pooled cost system,
but instead paid their share of the maternity leave through a different
process. The consequence of this system was that the small employers
were assessed a greater proportion of the maternity leave cost than larger
employers. The question for the Court was whether the disparity in cost
assessment was consistent with the Basic Law.
The Court concluded that the pooling method was not consistent with
the constitution, violating Article 3 equality norms and Article 12 occupational
freedoms. 1 2 The measure violated Article 3 because it resulted in
discrimination against women in their work life, especially here, of
course, for small employers. 7 3 While all employers were obligated to
share in the cost of maternity leave, the burden was unevenly borne by
small employers, which was not consistent with norms of equality. The
equality norms also carried over and influenced Article 12 occupational
freedoms. Here, the Court concluded that the measure also violated the
ability of women in small firms, to act upon their occupational freedoms,
illustrating the integrated approach to rights characteristic of the German
approach to rights.' '
Examining more carefully the equality aspects of the measure, the
Constitutional Court observed that equality norms required fulfillment of
equal treatment of men and women in society. 7 5 "Women must have
the same job opportunities as men.'16 Here too these equality notions
included the influence of European and international law.' The problem
in the case was that the assessment of the surcharge only on small
employers based on the pooling method could not be justified by an
171. Id. at 67.
172. Id. at 84-85.
173. Id. at 84.
174. Id. at 84-87.
175. Id. at 89.
176. Id.
177. Id. See, e.g.. Council Directive 76/207. 1976 O.J. (L39) (EC); Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, art.
11, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess.. 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/34//180/Annex (Dec. 18.
1979).
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adequate reason. 178 As presently conceived, the measure resulted in the
burden falling disproportionately on women, who are of childbearing
age and comprise a large share of the employees of small businesses.
Small businesses are thus disproportionately affected by this measure.
This constitutes a factual discrimination against women, which is to be
avoided as much as possible, notwithstanding the considerable discretion
available to the legislature. 179 The legislature is obligated to consider the
quality of factual discrimination in the measures it formulates, as this can
lead to a form of gender discrimination in the work place. 180 Therefore,
the measure was found unconstitutional and had to be refashioned to
take account of the impact on such women. As presently fashioned, the
measure entailed a significant burden on women181 The Court concluded
that the pooling method was a good way to share the costs of maternity
leave. 182 However, restricting the pool to only small employers that
tended to employ a larger percentage of women than larger employers was
inconsistent with Articles 3 and 12. Thus, the Court suggested that the pool be
expanded to include larger employers as a way of spreading the risk and
dealing with this problem.
183
F. United States Gender Equality
After race, gender was the next trait the Supreme Court considered for
treatment under equal protection. The turn of events was marked by
Reed v. Reed, where the Court for the first time invalidated a gender
classification under the Equal Protection Clause. 184 In Reed, the Court
invalidated an Idaho intestate provision that preferenced males over
females in the administration of the estate. The Court applied rational
basis review. In Frontiero v. Richardson, the members of the Court
engaged in a robust debate as to what level of scrutiny was appropriate
to gender discrimination. 185 Writing for four Justices, Justice Brennan
178. Maternity Leave, 109 BVerfGE at 89.
179. Id. at 90.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 90-91.
182. Id. at 92.
183. Id. at 92-95.
184. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In United States gender discrimination law, the first sets
of cases involved discrimination against males, not females, as this was the strategy of
now Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg in directing the ACLU Women's Rights Project. For
description of the ACLU's Women's Rights Project, see ACLU, Tribute: The Legacy of
Ruth Bader Ginsberg and WRP Staff (2006). available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/
ginsburgtribute2006O302.pdf. Some German gender discrimination cases also involve
discrimination against males, as in the Men Housekeepers case. BVerfG Nov. 13, 1979.
52 BVerfGE 369.
185. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Part of the uncertainty over what to do with gender
discrimination may have been influenced by the vibrant debate over whether to adopt the
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argued for strict scrutiny, as in race, on the ground that gender
classifications are inherently suspect. Lacking a fifth vote, however, there
was no majority for application of strict scrutiny in relation to gender
discrimination. This led to the Court's compromise in Craig v. Boren,
where the Court agreed on the appropriately named intermediate
scrutiny as the level of review to be applied to gender, which calls for
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."' 18 6
After Craig, the application of intermediate scrutiny was uneven and
unpredictable. In some cases, intermediate scrutiny was applied as an
intense level of scrutiny which could be referred to as quasi-suspect
class.8 But in other cases, application of intermediate scrutiny seemed
to lack rigor, and appeared more akin to a form of rational basis.88 The
confusion in the understanding and application of the standard led the
Court in United States v. Virginia (VMI) to clarify what intermediate
scrutiny means. 189 Under VMI, the standard as reformulated is:
The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State. The
State must show "at least that the [challenged] classification serves 'important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are
'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. "' The justification
must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.
And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents.
capacities, or preferences of males and females.
190
So VMI clarified that intermediate scrutiny connoted a degree of intensity to
the review.
equal rights amendment to the Constitution. guaranteeing "[e]quality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex." Id. at 687 (quoting Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. Res. No 208. 92nd Cong. 2nd
Sess. (1972)). The effort failed.
186. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
187. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (unconstitutional
to exclude male from college school of nursing solely on account of his gender): Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (Court invalidated a New York law granting the
mother but not the father of an illegitimate child the right to block the child's adoption
by withholding consent).
188. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (constitutional
for statutory rape to entail sex with only a female, not a male, under the age of 18);
Parham v. Hughes. 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (upholding constitutionality of a Georgia statute
permitting the mother, but not the father, of an illegitimate child to sue for wrongful
death of the child when the father had not formally legitimized the child).
189. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
190. Id. at 533 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks in original) (citations
omitted).
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The Court went on to explain the underlying basis for distinguishing
between men and women.
The heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not make sex a
proscribed classification. Supposed "inherent differences" are no longer accepted as
a ground for race or national origin classifications. Physical differences between
men and women, however, are enduring ....
"Inherent differences" between men and women, we have come to appreciate,
remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either
sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity. Sex classifications may
be used to compensate women "for particular economic disabilities [they have]
suffered," to "promot[e] equal employment opportunity," to advance full
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people. But such
classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the
legal. social, and economic inferiority of women.] 91
VMI's clarification of intermediate scrutiny applicable to gender raises a
number of issues.
First, even after VMI, there has been a certain inconsistency in the
application of the newly clarified form of intermediate scrutiny. In
Nguyen v. INS, the Court upheld a federal law that automatically granted
U.S. citizenship to a child of unmarried parents whose mother was a
U.S. citizen, but not to a child whose father was a U.S. citizen. 192 The
Court found that:
the difference does not result from some stereotype, defined as a frame of mind
resulting from irrational or uncritical analysis. There is nothing irrational or
improper in the recognition that at the moment of birth a critical event in the
statutory scheme and in the whole tradition of citizenship law-the mother's
knowledge of the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a
way not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father. This is not a stereotype....
To fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences such as
the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father need not be-risks
making the guarantee of equal protection superficial. and so disserving it.
Mechanistic classification of all our differences as stereotypes would operate to
obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real. The distinction
embodied in the statutory scheme here at issue is not marked by misconception
and prejudice. nor does it show disrespect for either class. The difference
between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one, and the
principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address the problem at
hand in a manner specific to each gender.193
The Court placed emphasis on the fact that establishment of parenthood
was vital to the attainment of citizenship which, of course, makes sense.
191. Id. at 533 34 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks in original)
(citations omitted).
192. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). But see Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (male state
employees can recover money damages from state for its failure to comply with the
Family and Medical Leave Act. Here, the state did allow a male employee to take 12
weeks off from work to care for his ailing wife from injuries suffered in a car accident,
but he needed more time.).
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However, the Court focused on the fact that parenthood was easier to
establish by a birth mother than a father. 
94
The clear inequality between children born to female American citizens
as compared to male American citizens does, in fact, seems to turn the
VMI standard on its head. As observed by the dissent: "[w]hile the Court
invokes heightened scrutiny, the manner in which it explains and applies
this standard is a stranger to our precedents."' 95 To the dissent, it appeared
that the Court was simply resorting to stereotype. The dissent states:
The claim that [the statute] substantially relates to the achievement of the goal
of a "real practical relationship" thus finds support not in biological differences
but instead in a stereotype-i.e, "the generalization that mothers are
significantly more likely than fathers ... to develop caring relationships
with their children.'
196
It appears that the dissent had the better of the arguments. After all, it is
hard to justify a difference over American citizenship in biological parents
based simply on one as the birth mother and the other as the father.
Biological parents are biological parents; it takes both to make a child,
and proof of parenthood could just as easily be established by gender
neutral means. 97 Furthermore, the child spent time in the United States
being raised by his father from the age of six onward, and became a
legal permanent resident. 98
Second, there appears to be a difference in the grounds that can justify
a disparity among sexes. Under German law, as we have observed, only
biological or functional difference can justify a measure that impacts
differently on gender. Stereotypical views of gender roles simply will not
do, as it was made clear by the Constitutional Court's rejection of this
rationale. Biological differences will be hard to find as a persuasive
justification, as we have observed. This leaves primarily a difference in
function-mainly work or socially related-as a valid basis for justifying a
gender difference which, as we have seen, the Constitutional Court examines
quite closely as well.
194. Id. at 62-63.
195. Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 88-89 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks in original).
197. Id. at 81 82.
198. Id. at 57, 85. Of course, it may not have helped that the young man, at age
twenty two, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault with minor. Id. at 57. But as
Justice O'Connor observed in her dissent, "[i]n 1997, a DNA test showed a 99.98%
probability of paternity, and, in 1998. Boulais [the father] obtained an order of parentage




American law is also concerned with eradicating gender stereotype,
which appears to be the main focus of the Supreme Court. The Court
additionally evaluates biological differences. In this respect, the Courts
share a common cause. By contrast, however, in probing these factors,
American gender law seems primarily to rely on "inherent" or "real"
differences, most of which are physiological or biological. 199 But as
observed by the dissent in Nguyen, a biological difference may, in fact,
rest on stereotype. Social or career functional differences do not seem to
play much of a role in United States law. Thus, in this respect, German
law would appear to probe much more deeply as to the underlying basis
for gender discrimination, aiming to root it out much more systematically
than American law.
Third, German law is concerned with achieving both formal and
substantive equality for genders. Of course, this mainly applies to women,
who have historically been placed in an inferior social position as
compared to men. Through the Social State principle, the state is obligated,
and the Constitutional Court so orders it, to take measures to achieve
substantive equality in society. Effectively, this means German law will
invoke affirmative actions measures to remove past social disadvantages
women have suffered. No such effort is apparent in American law. The
Supreme Court is simply concerned with achieving formal legal equality.
200
Men and women can then work it out for themselves as to how to reach
their potential.
Finally, in comparison to German law, we can observe a pattern of
inconsistent applications of gender equality norms in the United States.
Sometimes the scrutiny is probing, sometimes more deferential. German
law seems more consistent, both in the standard of review applied and in
striving to obtain equal treatment of men and women. German law is
concerned with achieving substantive equality between men and women
as well as formal equality. Where necessary, the Constitutional Court
and government will accord women preferences to attempt to equalize
social conditions, in a form of affirmative action.
Interestingly, both Courts seem to have established the level of
scrutiny at about the same time, in the later 1970s, with Craig v. Boren
in 1976 in the United States and Men Housekeepers in 1979 in Germany.
Possibly, this reflects the women's liberation movement of that time. A
199. For evaluation of this point, see GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TuSHNET, & PAMELA S. KARLAN. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
654-58 (5th ed. 2005); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 680 82 (14th ed. 2001).
200. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 199, at 664; Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming:
Abstract Equality. SuP. CT. REV. 201, 247 (1987): Frances E. Olsen. The Family and the
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notable difference, however, is that gender equality receives intermediate
scrutiny in the United States, but strict scrutiny in Germany. Part of this
may have to do with the explicit textual enumeration of gender in Article
3. Still, race, national heritage, or alienage (all suspect traits subject to
strict scrutiny) are not singled out in the opaque language of the Fourteenth
Amendment either. The German approach to gender discrimination quite
likely also reflects Germany's longer commitment to the principle.20 1
Thus, we might conclude that gender is a higher priority for the Constitutional
Court than the Supreme Court. Another interesting similarity between
both Courts is that decisions of the 1990s helped to clarify the meaning
of the gender equality standard. In the United States, the case was VMI;
in Germany, it was Night Worker. But here too we observe the same
difference: VMI clarified intermediate scrutiny, Night Worker clarified
strict scrutiny. Thus, there are both similarities and differences between
the two gender equality laws. However, it seems fair to say that German
law is both more probing and more logically consistent than United
States law.
IV. HEIGHTENED REVIEW OF SocIo-ECONOMIC MATTERS
We have already observed that German equality jurisprudence
employs a sliding scale range of review that varies from a strict scrutiny
form that applies to designated immutable personal traits, as described in
Parts II and III, to a low-level form of rational basis where the measure
can be justified simply by a plausible reason. Like American law,
German law divides the methodology of equality jurisprudence around
the difference in classification between immutable personal traits (strict
scrutiny) and socio-economic measures (heightened or rational basis).
But more interesting than this similarity is the difference between the
two laws.
In this last category of matters involving socio-economic matters, the
level of review in German law varies. First, if the measure triggers a
fundamental right other than equality, it results in disparate treatment of
similarly situated groups, or both, the Constitutional Court will intensify
the degree of its scrutiny and sustain the measure only if quite convincing
reasons are present; in essence, this is a form of intensive scrutiny. In
United States law, we might actually view this heightened form of
review as intermediate scrutiny. I will simply refer to it as heightened review.
201. See notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
F 12/30/2008 2:36:51 PM
EBERLE 
12302008 236 51PM
Under a more standard form of rational basis review, the Constitutional
Court will probe the inequality resulting from the measure and sustain it
if there is a sound reason to justify the difference. If neither dramatic
inequality nor any other right or group differential is present, the
Constitutional Court will sustain the measure if there is a sound
explanation. 20 2 What these different levels of socio-economic matters
indicate is that the Court varies its scrutiny based on the degree of
inequality present. Even review of socio-economic matters can be rigorous.
We will now turn to an examination of the sliding scale variety of review
applied to socio-economic matters, starting with heightened review.
The nature of heightened review is well captured by the Retirement
Benefits Case, a case concerning the formula for allocating retirement
benefits between public employees and employees who previously had
worked in the public sector, but had then left to work in the private
203sectors. The Court found the measure unconstitutional, as the formula
resulted in higher retirement income for public employees as compared
to now private employees. Even though this was just a socio-economic
measure, the Court nevertheless probed the measure quite intensely
based on the unequal treatment of the two generally similarly situated
groups and the implication of Article 12 occupational freedoms. As
observed by the Court:
The general equality provision of Article 3(1) obligates the legislator, under
the constant orientation of justice. to treat essentially equal the same and
unequal different. When a difference in dissimilar fact situations is present, and
that difference is great, the legislature is indeed obligated only to consider all
relevant factors as a matter of justice. By the ordering of large phenomenon, standard
and general norms may be necessary. In these situations, present difficulties
and injustices may be taken into account when the burden impacts on only a
small number of people and the violation of equality is not very severe. However,
when the economic consequences of a measure stands in a disproportionate
relationship to the standard allied advantages, then the measure is not consistent
with the equality norms of Article 3(1).
Even with standard norms, the legislature is subject to strong limitations when the
measure impacts on fundamental rights. That is the case here. The partial
reduction of expected retirement income affects the Article 12(1) guaranteed
occupational freedoms. 2
04
Thus, we can see that the Court will intensify its scrutiny of socio-
economic measures when there is significant disparity present in application
of the measure or it impacts on fundamental rights. Here, both concerns
202. Transsexual 1i, BVerfG Jan. 26, 1993, 88 BVerfGE 87, 96 97 ("When only
the simple prohibition against arbitrariness comes into play, a violation of Article 3(1)
can be established only when the lack of substantiation of the difference in treatment
evident is.").
203. BVerfG July 15, 1998, 98 BVerfGE 365 (1998).
204. Id. at 385.
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were implicated. The Court felt that private employees were treated less
favorably than public employees in the complicated formula used to
calculate retirement benefits and, secondly, that the amount of retirement
income had an effect on their occupational freedoms, as the lesser retirement
income might hamper their choices in pursuing career objectives.20 5
The nub of the formula at issue in the case was based, in significant
part, on the amount of the salary last earned upon leaving the public job
and the length of employment. Another factor was that retirement income
was also affected by an increase in the amount of the retirement subsidy,
which was then often offset by a reduction in the retirement amount
based on living conditions. This formula resulted in wildly disparate
retirement incomes, especially between retired public employees and
formerly public but then later private employees.20 6  As stated by the
Court, "It is contradictory on the one hand for public employees to
receive an especially high retirement living standard amount, but on the
other hand those who have left public employ find their living standard
function negated., 20 ' This disparity turned the Court's attention to the
fundamentals of equality jurisprudence:
The fundamental principle that all people are equal before the law should in the
first place prevent any favoring or disfavoring of people. Accordingly, the
legislature is subject to strict judicial control of any inequality. By only
behavior oriented differences, the nature of judicial control depends on how
much those affected are in a position through their actions to influence the
factors that result in the difference. On this point, legislative discretion is
narrowed the stronger the inequality that exists among people or fact situations
that might result in the curtailing of the exercise of protected freedoms. In these
cases, the Constitutional Court tests whether the asserted ground for the difference is
of such a type and weight so as to justify the disparate treatment.20 8
In this statement, we can observe the intense form of review that occurs
when similarly situated people are treated differently. Certainly there
was no implication here of a suspect trait, although as noted Article 12
occupational freedoms were also implicated.20 9  Still, the Court probed
the measure quite intensively. Considering the reasons given for the
205. Id.
206. Id. at 385-86.
207. Id. at 388.
208. Id. at 389.
209. The Court ruled that Article 12 occupational freedoms were violated because
the disparity in retirement income would dissuade public employees from leaving public
employ to enter the private sector. This would inhibit their right to work and also the




measure-applying a uniform formula for retired public employees (which
as demonstrated actually was not realized), that private employees can earn
more in the private sector than public employees, practicality, or budget
concerns-all were rejected as persuasive reasons to justify the discrepancy
in retirement income.2 1 °
Comparing Retirement Benefits to American law, we can observe both
similarities and differences. The two laws are similar in that if
fundamental rights are implicated, heightened scrutiny will apply. However,
the laws differ in that if just a gross inequality in the law is present,
German law would still apply heightened scrutiny whereas American
law would apply rational basis.
Another case involving heightened scrutiny concerned the computation
of income levels of a separated married couple for purposes of obtaining
state financial aid for university education.21 1 In the Separated Couple
University Aid Case, the couple had been separated for a long time.
Ordinarily under German law in such cases, the couple's income is
counted separately, not together. That was not the case here, as the
applicant for state aid was denied a state subsidy based on the composite
income of both spouses, notwithstanding that they had been long separated.
The Constitutional Court invalidated the provision as violative of Article
3 equality; the measure discriminated against a group of people, here
separated couples, without sound justification. The measure was especially
dubious because most other aspects of German law computed long separated
couples as having separate, not combined, incomes for purposes of qualifying
for benefits; this was the case in areas like welfare, unemployment benefits,
salary or tax matters. 21'
Concern also with the disparate treatment of essentially similarly
situated groups of people led to the declaration of unconstitutionality in
the Employee Termination Case.2 13 The case involved a disparity in length
210. Id. at 391 94.
211. Separated Couple University Aid, BVerfG Jan. 10, 1995, 91 BVerfGE 389.
Under German law, citizens are entitled to state subsidized support for university education
when they do not have adequate financial means to support the costs of university
education. The law is known as the federal education support law or Bundesausbild
ungsfoederungsgesetz (known as BAfoeg). The law is part of the social welfare net.
212. Id. at 402-03. In a case, 99 BVerfGE 165, involving similar concerns regarding
state funding of university education, the Constitutional Court found it unconstitutional
to deny a student access to state grants for higher education when the student claimed a
status independent of his parents, but the parents income was nevertheless used as part of
the calculation to see if the student would qualify for the state grant. In the case, the
student was seeking a second education and, under the formula for calculating benefits,
the parents' income was not high enough to cover the costs of the education. BVerfG
Nov. 10, 1998, 99 BVerfGE 165. The Court found no justifiable reason for the difference in
treatment of parent dependent and parent independent students. Id. at 178, 181.
213. BVerfG May 30, 1990, 82 BVerfGE 126.
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of notice of termination between physical (blue collar) and nonphysical
or mentally skilled workers (white collar). Blue collar workers received
two weeks notice of termination; while white collar workers received six
weeks notice of termination. When employees were in the employ
longer, the length of notice of termination increased. For blue collar
employees, ten years employment triggered a two months notice of
termination, twenty years employment, three months notice. For white
collar workers, five years employment triggered three months notice,
214
and ten years employment, five months notice. In this case, a woman
worked as a tailor in an apparel store for fifteen years. The employer
terminated her employment with an eight weeks notice of termination,
which occurred by reason of a collective bargaining agreement. Under
the collective bargaining agreement, white collar employees employed
for fifteen years received six months notice. 215 Because of the difference
in treatment of the two groups of employees, the Court applied heightened
scrutiny again.
An unequal treatment of several groups under the same norms is consistent with
the general equality norm of Article 3(1) only when the difference between the
groups can be justified by reasons of sufficient nature and weight. Disparity in
treatment and justifiable grounds must stand in a proportionate relationship to
one another. Thereby also to be considered in the balance is whether the
inequality will have an effect on basic protected freedoms.
216
Perhaps a disparity in treatment might be justified when a "generalization
impacts negatively only on a small group of people and the inequality is
not very severe. 217 In this case, there was no adequate justification for
the disparate treatment. For example, the idea that white collar workers
merit a longer notice of termination period because they are more
educated, having invested more time in building a career, is simply not a
sufficient basis for the differential treatment.2 18 This justification may
have worked in the past, but not today.219 The measure affected a large,
not small, group of people; hence, it could not be justified on the second
rationale either.
214. Id. at 128-29 (citing BGB § 622).
215. For coverage of the case, see Susanne Baer, Equality: The Jurisprudence of the
German Constitutional Court, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 250 (1999).
216. Employee Termination Case, 82 BVerfGE. at 146.
217. Id. at 152.
218. Id. at 148-49.




On the other hand, in a second employee termination case, Small
Business Employee Termination, the Court upheld a law that excluded
small business from the employee termination notice law based on the
need for clarity and efficiency. 220 Every law has certain elements of
generalization; in this case, that ground was sufficient to justify the
law.221 Clear rules are needed so the law can function efficiently.222
A final case also demonstrates the heightened evaluation of economic
measures. In the Private School Case, the Constitutional Court ruled
that it was unconstitutional for the city-state of Hamburg to subsidize
private schools that were religious, ideological, or both at a higher rate
per pupil (77%) than private schools that were nonreligious and
ideological (25% ).223 The constitutional basis for the ruling was Article
7(4), which guarantees the right to have private schools, in conjunction
with the equality mandates of Article 3. It seemed clear that the measure
favored schools that were religious, ideological, or both over nonreligous
and nonideological schools, but that was not the basis for the Court's
ruling. Instead, the Court looked at the groups affected-private schools-
and observed simply that all private schools must be treated the same. In
this case, this meant each must get the same financial support based on
percentage of pupils. 224 None of the reasons given to justify the difference in
treatment of the schools-financial situation, history or tradition and
length of existence, rectifying past wrongs committed against religious
schools under the Nazi regime, or fiscal concerns-served as an adequate
225ground on which to justify the disparate treatment.
Two other cases involving socio-economic matters further demonstrate
the need for a strong justification to explain disparate treatment of groups
similarity situated. In a case involving judges of the appellate ordinary
courts and the appellate administrative courts of North Rhein Westfalia,
the Court found there was no satisfactory explanation to justify the lower
pay accorded the President and Vice President of the appellate ordinary
courts as compared to the President and Vice President of the appellate
226administrative courts. Similarly, the Constitutional Court found the
disparate payment of World War II veterans benefits accorded German
citizens who previously lived in the German Democratic Republic and
those that had lived their lives in the Federal Republic of Germany
220. BVerfG Jan. 1, 1998, 97 BVerfGE 169 (182).
221. Id. at 182.
222. Id.
223. BVerfG Apr. 8, 1987, 75 BVerfGE 40 (43).
224. Id. at 71.
225. Id. at 70 73.




[VOL. 10: 63, 2008] Equality in Germany and the United States
SAN DIEGO INT' LL.J.
unconstitutional. 22' The lower amount of veterans' benefits could be
justified until 1998 on the ground that living standards in the former East
Germany were lower than in West Germany. But after 1998, there was
no justification for the lower payments to former East Germans as the
living standards had reached approximately the same plateau.22 8
Finally, matters involving tax law also merit heightened scrutiny when
the law impacts disparately on people.
[C]lassifications made in tax laws require special justification because of the
severity of their impact. A surprising number of such distinctions have actually
been found wanting: discriminatory taxation of chain stores, preferential treatment of
vertically integrated firms under the value-added tax, nondeductibility of partners'
salaries and of child-care expenses, to name only a few. These decisions stand in
sharp contrast to modern decisions in the United States. the Supreme Court has not
scrutinized classifications in tax laws with much care since the New Deal
revolution.
2 2 9
So, what we can observe under German equality jurisprudence is that
even mere economic matters can merit a more searching scrutiny that
simple rational basis when either the measure impacts disproportionately
on two relatively similar groups or when a fundamental right is impacted.
In these cases, the Court will uphold the measure only in the face of a
demonstrable convincing justification for the difference in treatment. It
seems clear that German law possesses a degree of rigor that is more
broadly applied as compared to United States law.
Under American equal protection review, mere economic measures
ordinarily are treated as presumptively constitutional unless they fail, in
the rare case, to satisfactorily demonstrate a rational purpose and means
that are rationally related to achievement of that purpose. Few American
cases of a socio-economic character fail rational basis. The most notable
is probably Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno, where the Court ruled,
under standard rational basis review, that excluding unrelated people
who shared an apartment from a federal food stamp program violated
equal protection.230 As observed by the Court: "For if the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
227. BVerfG Mar. 14, 2000, 102 BVerfGE 41.
228. Id. at 58 59.
229. Currie, supra note 109, at 368-69 (citations omitted). For citations to the German
cases, see id. nn.277 82.




unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. ,231
Romer v. Evans is similar, where the Court ruled that an amendment to
the Colorado Constitution that, among other things, denied access to the
courts to homosexuals for discrimination claims could not meet the
lenient standard of rational basis. 232 The Court relied on Moreno to observe,
again, that government cannot strike out at an unpopular or disfavored
group. Of the two cases, Moreno fits more naturally into rational basis
review because the personal status at issue-unmarried, unattached
people living together-was mutable and thus able to be changed by the
people themselves. There is some argument that the trait of homosexuality
at issue in Romer was less mutable and perhaps immutable, although
the science on this point is unsettled and controversial. Still, there might be
some argument that Romer could merit a form of heightened scrutiny,
most likely intermediate scrutiny under American law, as political
forces were clearly targeting a group of people based on their status. But
the Court never had to go that far, as it could dispose of the measure on
there simply being no legitimate reason for Colorado so acting.
A more problematic case is City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
where the Court also applied rational basis and found unconstitutional
the city's denial of a permit for the operation of a group home for the
mentally retarded.233 To the Court, this was a blatant discrimination,
since the city had granted permits for operation of hospitals, sanitariums,
nursing homes, and convalescent homes. But the inequality is not the
problem in the case; the trait is. Here the personal trait is mental retardation,
an immutable trait that fits within the Carolene Products justification for
heightened scrutiny since they are politically powerless. This was the
argument of Justice Marshall in his concurrence and partial dissent, but
to no avail. 2
34
V. RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC MATTERS
When no suspect class trait is involved or when no obvious disparity
in treatment among groups of people is present, the Constitutional Court
will apply the conventionally low-level review of rational basis to
ascertain whether the measure in question is constitutional or not. Even
here, however, the Court will require a convincing reason to justify disparate
treatment of groups of people. The standard of rational basis review,
therefore, is somewhat more demanding than the conventional United
231. Id. at 534.
232. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
233. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
234. Id. at 458-73.
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States approach that calls for, simply, a plausible reason 23 or where "the
question is at least debatable.,
236
A few cases will suffice to demonstrate the nature of German rational
basis review. In a case involving a pharmacy that wanted to continue
operating in a railroad station, the Constitutional Court found that officials
were justified in shutting down the pharmacy because a pharmacy dealt
with the dispersal of medicines and, therefore, was subject to more
stringent pharmaceutical regulations as compared to other businesses
that operated in the railroad station. 23' To the Court, these were sound
reasons for the difference in treatment among businesses. In a case
involving fees for children attending kindergarten, the Constitutional
Court ruled that the city was justified in applying a sliding scale of fees
238based on parental income levels. Other social programs, such as social
welfare benefits or income tax rates, used income levels; thus, they could
also be used for determining kindergarten fees.239 In a case where a
fifteen year old boy wanted to juice up his bicycle by adding a motor so
that he could travel as fast as twenty-five kilometers, the Court determined
it was permissible for authorities to cite the boy under the criminal law,
in contrast to the civil law that handles most traffic violations, because
the boy did not qualify yet for a driver's license, posing dangers to other
moving vehicles and pedestrians.2 40
A veterinarian sued claiming that he was entitled to exemption from
being required to testify under oath on the ground that he, like physicians
and lawyers, needed to protect confidential information acquired in his
practice. 24  However, the Constitutional Court denied the claim, reasoning
that veterinarians simply do not trade in sensitive personal matters as
physicians and lawyers.242 This made eminent sense, after all, as veterinarians
treat animals, not people. Thus, there are good reasons for the different
243treatment of veterinarians as compared to legal and medical professionals.
In another case involving the reunification of Germany, the Court ruled
235. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney. 406 U.S. 535, 546 47 (1972).
236. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (citing
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.. 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)).
237. BVerfG Nov. 29, 1961, 13 BVerfGE 225.
238. BVerfG Mar. 10, 1998, 97 BVerfGE 332.
239. Id. at 344.
240. BVerfG Mar. 27, 1979, 51 BVerfGE 60.
241. BVerfG Jan. 15, 1975, 38 BVerfGE 312, 313.
242. Id.




that a difference in treatment of the debt burden of a former East German
company as compared to a West German company could be justified by
the difference in economic standards between the then two Germanys.
244
VI. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS
Equality as a seminal value in both German and United States society
is led primarily by the constitutional Courts of the two countries. Both
Courts have directed the impulse toward realization of equality in society,
with the legislatures generally following the Courts' lead. Both Courts
have a common commitment to a core component of equal treatment of
all people.
There are important similarities between the two laws, mainly reflecting
the post-World War Ii rights revolution. Both the German and American
Courts employ a sliding scale of judicial review, with the intensity of the
review varying according to whether a suspect class or a fundamental
right was involved (strict scrutiny) or the measure simply involved
general socio-economic measures (rational basis). Both Courts identify
certain traits as suspect, meriting extremely intensive judicial scrutiny.
Both Courts prefer, where possible, to defer the formation of public
policy to the political process. Both Courts combine equality protections
with other substantive rights protections; for Germany, this is part of its
comprehensive and integrated approach to rights; for the United States,
this is part of the substantive rights component of equal protection law.245
Still, while the Courts seem to be in accord with a general sense over
these points, there are important differences. German equality law demarcates
far more traits as suspect (for example, race, sex, gender, language,
national origin, disability or faith, religious or political opinion) as
compared to American law (race, national origin, and alienage). This
may have to do with the more explicit text of the Basic Law, as previously
observed. But it may also have to do with the German concern regarding
every person being of equal worth. Those most vulnerable or most ill
equipped to affect society or the political process merit higher attention
by the German Court. While the Supreme Court has invoked similar
rationales in applying strict scrutiny to suspect classes, it has been far
more hesitant to extend the range of suspect classes. Underlying difference
in approaches of the two countries over suspect classes and vulnerable
people is the German consideration of the degree to which it is within a
person's control to affect the measure at issue. In the United States, this
is part of the consideration involved in the idea of "discrete and insular
244. BVerfG Apr. 8, 1997. 95 BVerfGE 267.
245. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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minorities" or those who are politically powerless in assessing whether a
trait might be classified as suspect.246 While this is also true in Germany,
the German Court looks into this factor for all people, not just those
most vulnerable, in ascertaining what level of scrutiny to apply.
Further assessing treatment of the most vulnerable, the two Courts
differ on strategies for achievement of equality. The Supreme Court is
mainly concerned with addressing issues of formal, legal inequality.
Measures that legally treat groups differently (mainly over traits considered
suspect or quasi-suspect) will generally be found to violate equality. But
there are deeper issues to be addressed over equal treatment: the socio-
economic reality of the society that citizens live within. This is an issue
of substantive equality: are equal opportunities and conditions available
to all? This question is mainly one that affects vulnerable groups in
society, like people grouped by race, gender, illegitimacy, or disability,
to name a few.
On this point, there are important differences between the laws of two
nations. In the United States, affirmative action is mainly impermissible
241
under the Rehnquist Court's reconception of race equality. One
exception is university admissions, where race can be considered as a
plus factor aiding the chance of admissions, as other nonracial factors
are also so considered, in an individualized assessment of applicants,
under application of the strict scrutiny standard. 248  Thus, the goal of
realizing a degree of substantive equality within society is not a major
priority of the Supreme Court.
This is in stark contrast to the German Constitutional Court, whose
goal is realization of equality for all people in society. In particular,
affirmative state measures are necessary and required for those most
vulnerable in society, to rectify past discrimination or to create conditions in
present society so that every person can achieve their due. In the law we
have observed, the Court has taken a proactive role especially with
regard to gender (mainly women), illegitimate children, and those with
disabilities. In significant part, this reflects the priorities of the German
246. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 53 n.4 (1938).
247. See, e.g, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("we
hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.").
248. Grutter v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The strict scrutiny standard applied
to affirmative action matters is a slightly more lenient standard than conventional strict
scrutiny. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237 ("we wish to dispel the notion that strict
scrutiny is -strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'").
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constitutional order: human dignity, development of personality, and
commitment to the Social State; meaning the state is obligated to provide for
everyone a certain minimum of security, equal services and opportunities.
Focusing on gender for a moment, we have previously observed how
much more comprehensive the German Court's evaluation of matters
entailing gender equality is compared to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court mainly considers gender stereotype and "inherent differences,"
mainly biological, in assessing whether discrimination is involved.249
The German Court considers these factors as well, but probes even more
deeply: social or work functions are carefully considered as well to
determine whether discrimination is afoot. This is just another example
of the German Court's aim of achieving substantive equality as well as
legal.
Another important difference is how the two Courts treat socio-
economic measures. We are all familiar with the conventional American
approach to socio-economic measures: formation of public policy that
does not touch upon an immutable personal trait that allows a person
little ability to affect social measures is considered presumptively
constitutional and, therefore, almost always upheld.250 Essentially, the
Court stays out of the political fray, leaving it to the political process.
The Constitutional Court too prefers to leave the fixing of public
policy to the political process. However, the Constitutional Court probes
carefully any inequalities, even those involving just socio-economic
measures. The nature of review here is sliding, as we have previously
observed. It can be quite deferential, involving the arbitrariness prohibition
of which, like rational basis review, calls simply for a sound explanation
for the measure. But it can also be quite intensive, mainly when the disparity
between groups similarly situated is too large. What this shows is that
the Constitutional Court is concerned with achieving equality across the
board, through society, with respect to all citizens.
The harder nature of the German Court review of socio-economic
measures seems reminiscent, in ways, of the Supreme Court during the
Lochner251 era, before the advent of the New Deal Court. In the Lochner
era, the Court closely reviewed any measure impacting socio-economic
matters, under equal protection or due process, and invalidated many of
them. Still, there is a major difference here. During the Lochner era, the
Court mainly focused on matters germane to the economy, such as
freedom of contract that primarily benefited employers, but focusing
much less on those most vulnerable within society, such as workers or
249. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
250. Again, a rare exception would be USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
251. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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the poor. By contrast, the German Court applies a rigorous review to
equality measures consistently over all areas, suspect class, other personal
traits, and socio-economic matters, focusing again on the nature of the
inequality. In short, achieving equality seems to be a stronger commitment
of the German Court than the American Court.
Another difference is the logic and consistency of the two laws.
American law has varied over time. Consider race as an example. In the
1940s and 1950s, race was a suspect class that applied only to minorities,
triggering strict scrutiny.252 Then, in the 1970s and 1980s, affirmative
action for racial minorities developed and the Court would apply
intermediate scrutiny.253 Finally, in the 1990s, strict scrutiny was applied to
any racial classification, majority or minority status.254 Likewise, we
have seen the inconsistent application of gender discrimination law under
intermediate review.255 By contrast, German gender discrimination law
has been applied fairly consistently over the same period. The judicial
standard has changed from time to time. But whatever standard the Court
applied, it still probed quite carefully for gender discrimination.
There may be several explanations for this. One may be the different
natures of the countries' legal systems. The United States system is based
on the common law, and this is reflected too in the thought process of
the Supreme Court. Under common law reasoning, courts tend to focus on
facts, deriving principles therefrom. But different fact scenarios can lead
a court to change doctrinal positions, which can lead to a certain
inconsistency in the law. By contrast, German law is based on the Roman
law. The German version of Roman law calls for developing law into a
science, where thinking must occur within a grand, internally consistent
body of principles. It is a legal system based on a philosophic scheme.
252. See, e.g. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954): Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
253. E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion).
254. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
255. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding Oklahoma law that
prohibits sale of 3.2% alcohol beer to males under the age of twenty-one but not females
is unconstitutional), with Michael M. v. Superior Court. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications very deferentially to uphold explicit facial
gender inequality in the age requirement-eighteen-of males and females for statutory
rape), and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (restoring intermediate
scrutiny to a degree of rigor by requiring that for gender differences "[t]he justification
must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it
must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities. or
preferences of males and females.").
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A still more fundamental reason may lie at the root of the two Court's
different approaches: the vision of the Constitution they are pursuing, an
American constitution of liberty as compared to a German constitution
of dignity. Applying these visions to equality jurisprudence, American
law mainly still follows the theory of Carolene Products: socio-economic
measures are the province of the political process and, therefore, the
courts will stay out as much as possible. By contrast, matters impinging
on discrete and insular minorities or those who are politically powerless
will trigger more intensive review by the Court. Essentially, the courts
want to stay out of the fray, and leave matters to the democratic process,
unless a fundamental right or some other matter of high magnitude is at
issue. The nature and quality of the American polity is thus essentially
one to be determined by political forces, within the framework of the
Constitution; for equality, this means a fundamental right.
By contrast, under the German constitution of dignity the Court is
obligated to carry out the vision of the Basic Law: human dignity,
development of human personality and guarantee of personal and social
security. The focus is on each person who is considered human and,
therefore, of equal worth. In our discussion of equality, we can now see
that the Court's across the board approach to all equality issues is rooted
in the belief that equality for all truly matters, as a seminal value in
society. Where those most vulnerable are involved, the Court will
require affirmative measures to create equal conditions, an illustration of
the proactive approach to realization of equality. In these respects, the
Constitutional Court is quite a bit more proactive, intervening in the
political process, as compared to the Supreme Court. At bottom, then,
we can observe different patterns in the two constitutional orders concerning
interpretation and application of equality.
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